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ABSTRACT 
A Palestinian State 
by 
Jennifer A. Hileman-Tabios 
Dr. Mehran Tamadonfar, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor of Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 Should an independent, sovereign state of Palestine have the right 
to exist?  The establishment of an independent Palestinian state is 
important because it could possibly end an extended period of violence 
with Israel, where civilian casualties have been high, and it could help to 
solidify a foundation of political tolerance and acceptance in the Middle 
East.  Under the proposed two-state solution, an independent Palestinian 
state is possible.  However, to determine if a Palestinian state is viable, it 
will be necessary to examine internal political struggles, economic 
resources, systems of communication, political systems and internal and 
external political policies.  This qualitative research will focus on 
examining the resources and systems that would be essential in creating 
a solid infrastructure and foundation for the Palestinian people and a 
strong, sovereign, internationally recognized Palestinian state. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians has been raging 
since the establishment of Israel after World War II.  The European Jews 
displaced after the Holocaust desired the present state of Israel, formerly 
Palestine, and they were encouraged by other states.  It did not seem to 
matter, to the Zionists or to the rest of the world, that the land was 
already occupied and belonged to the Palestinians.  Since the late 1940’s 
the Palestinians have been fighting for their right to exist in their 
homeland and reclaim their homes.  Popular media, however, especially 
in the western world, does not paint a realistic picture of the conflict 
between the Israelis and Palestinians.  The western world, the United 
States in particular, fully and blindly, supports Israel and their 
oppressive, violent actions against the Palestinians.  Over the years, as 
Palestinians have fought for their land and homes, different political 
groups have come into power to represent the interests of Palestine as a 
whole.  The Palestine Liberation Organization, the political group Fatah, 
and the controversial political group Hamas, have all stood up to Israel in 
an attempt to reclaim their land, more presently in the areas of Gaza and 
the West Bank.  Hamas is controversial because of their violent acts 
towards Israel, in an attempt towards resolution, and as a result has 
offended parts of the international community.  The interference of these 
institutions and the international scrutiny of others have made it even 
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more difficult for the Palestinians to make a united stand and establish a 
sovereign state.  The establishment of a Palestinian state is important 
because it could possibly end an extended period of violence, where 
civilian casualties have been high, it could help to solidify a foundation of 
political tolerance and acceptance in the Middle East and it can promote 
positive global change for human rights. 
 The viability of a Palestinian state has been affected by economic, 
political and geographic factors.  Several of these obstacles are 
compounded by the role that larger countries play.  Economically, the 
Palestinians are completely dependent on Israel for their success and 
survival.  If Israel places limitations or restrictions on the Palestinians 
and their economic livelihood, the Palestinians are at their mercy as they 
have no recourse to supplement their economic earning base.  The 
political obstacles that Palestinians face are some of the most far 
reaching and detrimental to their independent existence.  The internal 
political corruption in the Palestinian Authority creates problems for the 
Palestinians before they even begin to cross international borders.  The 
lack of political cohesion among Palestinians and their well founded 
distrust in their political leaders, results in a disjointed political system 
that is not legitimized by the people.  To move beyond the internal 
obstacles and look at the international political issues only multiplies the 
issues facing the Palestinians.  The Middle East, as a region, does not 
exude a sense of solidarity and unification.  Any type of regional support 
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that the Palestinians could use to enforce their political standing is 
virtually non existent.  One of the Palestinian’s’ major obstacles is their 
political relationship with Israel in that externally affects both the 
Palestinian’s economic and geographical situations.  The fact that the 
United States is such a major factor, with their continuous support for 
Israel, it compounds the political scenario even further.  Geographically 
the Palestinians have been separated.  The result of the Six Days war in 
1967 divided the Palestinian areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  
The borders that were established and are being resiliently reinforced 
prevent the Palestinian people from creating a strong unified state or 
sense of community.  This major geographic separation of land is not 
conducive to the establishment of a state.  One of the four characteristics 
that a state must have in order to be called a state is territory.  Presently, 
in addition to the limited territory the Palestinians do have, Israel 
continues to enter the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in densely populated 
Palestinian communities, to build Jewish settlements.  In addition to 
tackling the national border issue, Palestinians are also struggling with 
the internal geographic problem of communities being divided by the 
Israelis.  Observing all of the obstacles, both internal and external, that 
the Palestinian people are facing, explains why they have been unable to 
focus on themselves directly and try to establish a legitimate state.  
 Several conditions must be met to create a strong, legitimate, 
viable Palestinian state.  Those characteristics would be a unified 
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geographic territory, a stable, legitimate government, a group of people or 
population, typically with cultural ties, and the right to a sovereign 
nation.  Geographically the issue of a fractured territory has been 
introduced.  In addition, the Palestinian political system suffers from 
several limitations as well.  Internally, the Palestinian Authority struggles 
to be legitimized.  The political struggle between Hamas and Fatah 
further complicates the internal dynamic.  The Palestinians, as a people, 
struggle to unite for their determined agenda.  Palestinians are physically 
separated.  Due to this separation, the Palestinians have many different 
loyalties and identities.  Ranging from Pan Arabism to Nationalism, 
Palestinians do not know how to unite.  One overarching, all 
encompassing solution seems to undermine the complexity of the 
Palestinian people.  Sovereignty, the idea that the supreme and absolute 
authority of the state rests with the people of that state is a concept that 
is being outrageously violated, when it comes to the Palestinians, most 
specifically by Israel.  Even if the Palestinians were able to overcome all 
of the other internal obstacles that face them, if they are not recognized 
as a sovereign entity, any progress would be fruitless.  The establishment 
of a strong, sovereign nation is that the only way that a Palestinian state 
will be viable.   
A comprehensive look at the history of Palestine and its people, in 
addition to an empirical analysis of contemporary issues, through 
secondary sources, is necessary to assess the viability of a Palestinian 
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state.  Historically, a review of Palestine under British rule, before and 
during World War II, would be necessary in establishing the series of 
events that have lead to the present Palestinian situation.  Next, a closer 
look at the history of violence and conflict between the Palestinians and 
Israelis will also assist in painting the reality of the present day situation.  
The internal and external factors will be evaluated to determine the 
interconnectedness of both challenges.  A discussion of the foundation of 
a solid infrastructure is also necessary in determining how prepared, or 
unprepared, the Palestinians are in establishing a viable state.  Will new 
geographic boundaries be necessary?  Is there sufficient political 
organization to build roads and schools and develop communities?  Is 
there enough money to build a solid infrastructure?  All of these 
questions will be addressed to explain the viability of a Palestinian state. 
 The fractured internal dynamics of the Palestinians is one of the 
major contributing factors to their present day struggle.  The internal 
issues, such as culture and Palestinian identity, establish and compound 
any external issues they might have.  Most external obstacles are a direct 
result of the internal ones.  The Palestinian people are strong enough to 
stand on their own and exist in a sovereign state, free from any 
interference of large, core states.  Once the Palestinians are able to 
establish and solidify a strong internal identity, they can begin to build 
their state from the inside out.  To assist in their internal development, it 
is going to be necessary for Israel to relinquish the lands gained in the 
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Six Days war and allow the Palestinians to return to the 1967 borders.  
Once the Palestinians have a geographically united territory, they can 
begin to establish a unified, national state.  In addition, a solid political 
system is going to need to be discussed and negotiated and compromises 
are going to have to be made.  Perhaps a complete overhaul, of the 
already established Palestinian Authority, is necessary for the success of 
an independent state to ascertain a legitimate system that is respected 
and supported by the people.  The restructuring of the political system 
will probably be one of the most difficult internal obstacles to 
accomplish.  The politics and political leaders can not remain as divided 
and self serving as they are now.  It will be important for the different 
political groups to work together to create a unified system.  If it remains 
separated and fractured, the political leaders will not be legitimized by 
the people and they will have a hopeless time moving to the next step of 
state development.  Once the obstacles of national identity and internal 
politics have been addressed, the Palestinians can focus on building their 
state infrastructure.  The development of roads and schools and natural 
resources will lead to a strong economic system.  Palestinians can then 
focus on a defense system that will protect themselves and their 
interests.  Concluding their course of internal development, the 
Palestinians will then be able to focus on external matters.  At that time 
they will be able to demonstrate to the world that they, indeed, are a 
viable state that can exist on its own and participate on a global stage. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
For decades now, Palestinians have been trying to get back on 
their feet and establish a sovereign Palestinian state.  This has proved 
nearly impossible with Israel’s hegemonic domination supported by the 
international community.  International groups and countries verbally 
condemn Israel for their treatment of the Palestinians, yet no action is 
ever taken to stop the Israelis and to support the Palestinians.  However, 
there are several obstacles, both external and internal, that need to be 
addressed by the Palestinians and their political leaders before a 
sovereign, legitimate state can be created.   
 
Nation and State Building 
 Creating a state or building a nation requires the attention of 
several different variables.  Political Scientists developed a renewed focus 
on nation building after World War II as several countries were being 
rebuilt and new nations were being established.  Nation and state 
building theories have suggested that either external factors or internal 
factors can stand in the way of establishing a state; either one or the 
other or even both.  External obstacles can be examined through 
Developmental and Dependency theories.  Developmental theories do not 
focus on the lack of development by a group or territory; instead they 
focus on possible solutions using different variables.  One variable is a 
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strong democratic political system, suggesting that for a state to develop, 
a democratic system is necessary.  However, for industrialized, 
democratic, capitalist nations to apply their policies on smaller, 
undeveloped nations is sufficiently useless.  The typical outcome is the 
increased repression and exploitation of the people and a textbook 
definition of a state cannot be forced on just any developing nation.  
Theories of Underdevelopment are closely related as they suggest a 
dependency of weaker, underdeveloped satellite states on larger capitalist 
states.      
 Internal obstacles, that developing nations face, are hurdles such 
as Nationalism and class structure, which are major themes in 
Structuralist theory.  Comparativists explain that political development is 
co-dependent on Nationalism.1  Nationalism is the promotion of a 
citizen’s pride in their nation, it helps foster respect and obedience of 
governmental authority and it helps legitimize the government.  It is the 
collective emotional response that people elicit for their country and it 
can be a movement for protecting a state’s freedom and independence 
from the face of an external threat.  It has played a role in economic, 
social, cultural and psychological development.  All of the things that 
Nationalism represents work smoothly in a democratic government, but 
when Nationalism is applied to a state that does not have a strong 
                                                           
1 Chilcote, Ronald H. Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm 
Reconsidered. Colorado: Westview Press, 1981.  Page 99.  
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European tradition and influence that is when Nationalism can begin to 
create all kinds of problems.  The “classical” origins of Nationalism are 
deeply rooted in European traditions.  Over the centuries, several 
different takes on Nationalism have been constructed and utilized.  
Modern nationalism has been viewed as liberal or republican, 
reconstructive, integral, cultural, and religious and secessionist.  Each 
new wave of nationalism developed as the people in Europe, or the people 
controlled by Europe, saw fit.  The tradition of Nationalism was taken on 
the boats to the Americas where the US was created in a European 
image.  It is extremely difficult to apply the idea of Nationalism to areas 
such as Africa, South America and the Middle East.  They do not have a 
strong European influence that has emphasized concepts such as 
Nationalism.   These regions have rich, non-European histories that 
make it extremely hard for them to adjust to a phenomenon like 
Nationalism.  However, can a unified pride and identity of a particular 
nation help to solidify and legitimize that nation?   
 Arab Nationalism is a type of Nationalism that was created by the 
Arabs at the turn of the twentieth century.  It emerged as a way for 
Middle Eastern Arabs to unite over their experiences with imperialism.  
Arab Nationalism represented diverse and fragmented ideas that came 
from a diverse and fragmented Arab world.  It provided Arabs with an 
alternate reality, a reality away from the one in which they found 
themselves.  The process of forming a nationalist self-view among the 
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Arabs began with the adaptation to Near Eastern conditions of the 
European concept of patria and patriotism.2  The Middle East is made up 
of such a variety of cultures, and each culture has their own unique and 
specific history.  Arab Nationalism incorporated all of those differences 
and reflected the diversity of the people and their cultures.  The 
foundation of this Nationalism was rooted in the belief that the Arab 
world was united by language, history, geography and the ideology that a 
new reality was possible for the Arab people.  The consistency of this 
belief is what has propelled the idea of Arab Nationalism forward and has 
helped to homogenize the Arab experience.  One of the first hurdles for 
the Arabs and their Arab Nationalism was the struggle for political 
independence.  It was not a success early on as each state was struggling 
to identify themselves within the region, while at the same time acting in 
the best interest of their country.  The Arab-Israeli conflict has become a 
major focal point of Arab Nationalism as it is associated with the 
intrusion of Western powers into the Middle East.3  
The Structuralist perspective perceives that the functions of the 
state are determined by the structures of society and not by the people 
who hold positions of power.  In social sciences, Structuralist theories 
                                                           
2 Khalidi, Rashid. The Origins of Arab Nationalism. Columbia University Press, 1991. 
Page 4. 
3
 Khalidi, Rashid. The Iron Cage: the Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. 
Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 2007. Page 83. 
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focus on the all inclusive general significance of the internal systemic 
relation of elements and their role in specific events.  Two types of 
Structuralist theories that lend themselves to state and nation building 
are neo-realism and world systems theory.  Neo-realism explains that the 
international system is the major deciding factor of the developments in 
international politics.  Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems theory 
describes the inter-relationship between core, semi-periphery and 
periphery states.  He accounts for the different levels of states, by first 
identifying what a state is.  The modern state is a sovereign state.  
Sovereignty is a concept that was invented in the modern world-system.  
Its prima facie meaning is totally autonomous state power.4  Wallerstein 
explains how states organize themselves internally and how that can 
affect states relationships with one another.  The most significant arena 
of social action was that which occurred within the boundaries of the 
state. Using this premise, many things seemed obvious: States were 
sovereign, they also had historical roots. They had economies, political 
systems, social norms and structures, and cultural heritages, each of 
which could be specified by social scientists. What distinguished one 
state from another was its specific combination of these parallel 
spheres.5   He explains that the world-economy develops a pattern where 
                                                           
4 Wallerstein, Immanual. World Systems Analysis: An Introduction. United States: Duke 
University Press, 2004. Page 42. 
5 Wallerstein, Immanual. Page 25. 
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state structures are relatively strong in the core areas and relatively weak 
in the periphery.6  Dependency theory is a direct off shoot of Wallerstein’s 
world systems theory that has been explored in both developed and 
developing countries.  The theory suggests that poor underdeveloped 
states in the periphery are exploited by the developed imperialistic states 
of the core.  The core states exploit the periphery states to increase their 
economic development and gain and maintain wealth.  It also argues that 
the economic depravation of the periphery states is a direct result of their 
integration into the world system.7  Some premises of Dependency 
theories are; periphery states provide a home for obsolete technology and 
markets for the core states, a state of dependence is perpetuated through 
policies and proposals, and when periphery states attempt to resist the 
core states, economic sanctions are placed or even military force is used.  
However, the world-system is much less reliant on direct political-
military coercion, and more reliant on economic exploitation which is 
organized through the production and sale of commodities.8   It is 
suggested that this vicious circle can lead to social revolution.  In his 
Structural theory of Imperialism, Johan Galtung explains that the 
relationship between the core and periphery states is at the expense of a 
                                                           
6 Wallerstein, Immanuel. “The Modern World System.” New York: Academic Press, 1976. 
Page 6 
7 Chilcote, 243. 
8 Chase-Dunn, Christopher K. Global Formation: Structures of the World Economy. 
Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998. Page 204. 
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majority of the people in the periphery state and is only in the best 
interest of the core state.  Hegemonic relations between nations and 
other collectivities will not disappear with the disappearance of 
imperialism; nor will the end to one type of imperialism (e.g. political, or 
economic) guarantee the end to another type of imperialism (e.g. 
economic or cultural).9 
 The case of the Palestinians is unique in that they are struggling 
from both internal and external obstacles.  Their struggle to self govern is 
compounded by the fact that not only are there external complications, 
those complications are leading to internal complications as well.  In this 
particular case, the external obstacles are creating the internal obstacles.  
The complexity and diversity of these wide ranging obstacles can better 
be explained through the environmental theory.  The environmental 
theory explains several dynamics of a state, such as the geography, 
culture, population, climate and the political geography.   
 
Environmental Theories 
Environmental theory explains that geographic and climatic 
circumstances influence national characteristics, foreign policies of 
                                                           
9 Galtung, Johan. “A Structural Theory of Imperialsim.” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 
8, No. 2 (1971). Page 2. 
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states and state identity.10  The United States and their pursuit of 
national land expansion under the widely accepted idea of Manifest 
Destiny is an example of how geography influenced a nation and their 
characteristics.  The US government was able to accomplish their 
expansion by nurturing a unified attitude among Americans and 
fostering a national concept at a national level.  Environmental theory 
includes a discussion on political geography, which is the relationship 
between politics and geography.11  An examination of political geography 
includes factors such as: individuals, government, groups of people, and 
social institutions.  The environmental factors that are considered when 
measuring the political geography are: national and human-created 
systems, national resources and urban areas.  Political geography is a 
concept that goes hand in hand with the current Palestinian situation.  
Ultimately it is an internal obstacle that is influenced, at each level, by 
an outside external obstacle.   
 Geopolitics is another aspect of Environmental theory that focuses 
on the study of people, the state, and the world as organic units.12  The 
state is viewed as a living organism that occupies space, contracts, grows 
and eventually dies.  The state is then modified to be only an aggregate-
                                                           
10 Pfaltzgraff Jr., Robert L. and James E. Dougherty. Contending Theories of 
International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey. New York: Longman, 1997.  Page 
144-145 
11 Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 147 
12 Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 158 
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organism which is forged by moral and spiritual forces.13  What is 
people’s relationship to nature?  Geopolitics evaluates climate, 
topography, and natural resources.  It is hypothesized that humans are 
in an unending struggle for living space because a state’s land area 
indicates that state’s power.  Due to this correlation, states make every 
effort to expand their borders.  This urge to expand causes boundaries to 
shift and change all the time, creating conflict between the states.  States 
are in a relentless struggle for survival.14  Geopolitics has evolved over 
the years as a measure of the relationship between geography and power.  
Can a state’s geography influence their political power?  This question is 
addressed in the core-periphery model based on dependency theory.  
According to the realist school of thought, the geographic location of 
states will condition that state’s political behavior.  Both neo-realists and 
neo-liberals suggest that human culture and physical features are a 
major part of Environmental theory.   
 Arnold Toynbee, an early twentieth century historian, intensifies 
Environmental theory by suggesting that civilizations come into existence 
in environments that harbor difficult challenges.  Civilizations then 
develop a unified force to overcome the difficulty allowing them to move 
on to the next challenge.  In turn, the subsequent challenge elicits a new 
                                                           
13 Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 158 
14 Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 158  
 16 
response or solution that provides the civilization with the tools to 
problem solve and advance their community.15  Toynbee’s idea is known 
as the challenge-response cycle.  The possibilities for a civilization are 
potentially infinite, but his theory does not allow for the prediction of 
possible obstacles or solutions.  Toynbee provides 5 types of challenging 
stimuli to support his hypothesis.  Two of his stimuli are physical; they 
are hard country and new ground.  Hard country is a country possessing 
a harsh climate, terrain and soil.  New ground is the exploration, opening 
up, and development of a wilderness into productive land.  Toynbee’s last 
three stimuli are non-physical; they are, challenges emanating from 
another state, continuous external pressure against a state, and a 
stimulus of penalization- that is if a state loses the use of a particular 
component, it is likely to respond by increasing correspondingly the 
efficiency of another component.16  The stimulus of penalization can also 
be demonstrated through racial discrimination.  Certain classes and 
races have suffered for centuries from various forms of penalization 
imposed upon them by other classes or races that have had mastery over 
them.  Penalized classes or races generally respond to this challenge of 
being excluded from certain opportunities and privileges by putting forth 
exceptional energy and showing exceptional capacity in such directions 
                                                           
15 Toynbee, Arnold and David Churchill Somerville. A Study of History: Abridgement of 
Volumes I-VI, Volume 1. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946. Page 48. 
16 Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 150 
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as are left open to them.17  Toynbee notes that an overly severe physical 
challenge can hinder a civilization’s development.  The Arabian nomad 
falls into the latter category.   
 Harold and Margaret Sprout have made major contributions to 
Environmental theory.  They have examined the role that geography 
plays in examining political behavior by suggesting that most human 
activity is affected by the uneven distribution of resources.  The 
interrelationship of geography, demography, technology and resources 
are compared and examined.  This examination not only focuses on the 
internal, domestic aspects of a state, but how states interact with one 
another.  The Sprouts assess the environment in its relationship to 
human activity.  They imply that operation milieu affects human activity 
in that, factors can limit individual performance or the outcome of 
decisions, based on perceptions of the environment.18  Environmental 
factors become related to the attitudes and decisions which comprise a 
state's foreign policy only by being perceived and taken into account in 
the policy-forming process. The statesman's psycho-logical environment 
(that is, his image, or estimate, of the situation, setting, or milieu) may or 
may not correspond to the operational environment (in which his 
                                                           
17 Toynbee, Arnold. A Study of History. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946. Page 
572 
18 Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 159 
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decisions are executed).19   To strengthen the argument for the 
Palestinian people, the application of cognitive behavioralism provides 
the assumption that a person consciously responds to the environment 
through perception and no other way.  Political decisions are based on 
what the state leaders’ perception of the environment is.   
Resource scarcity and conflict are two major components of 
Environmental theories that help demonstrate the relationships between 
core and periphery states.  The depletion of natural resources can lead to 
conflict as states and people become so desperate they resort to violence 
to attain them.  Nonrenewable resources cause the biggest conflict 
because once they are consumed, they are gone.  In terms of renewable 
resources, water causes the most conflict.  Environmental scarcity can 
lead to economic depravation and conflict which contributes to civil strife 
and increases economic and political pressures on governments, possibly 
resulting in a weakening of state legitimacy.20  To compound the issue of 
economic development and resource scarcity, the chance of conflict 
increases because of their geographic location.   Geography, and 
specifically the location of political entities in close proximity to each 
other, is said to create opportunity for conflict to the extent that states 
sharing borders with each other are more likely to engage in conflict than 
                                                           
19 Sprout, Harold and Margaret. “Environmental Factors in the Study of International 
Politics”. Sage Publications, Inc. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Dec., 
1957), pp. 309-328 
20 Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 164 
 19 
are states that are noncontiguous.21  Throughout history, conflict has 
been more about territorial issues than political goals.  Environmental 
theories suggest that a war in one state increases the chances that there 
will be war in one or more other states, demonstrating a domino type 
effect.          
 
Institution Building 
 Institution building is an important component in the development 
of a state.  The internal system of a state relies upon the effectiveness 
and efficiency of state institutions.  Institutions serve as a link between a 
state’s political system and the people of that state.  At times institutions 
link states to one another and play a major role in the development of a 
state.  Max Weber argued that states are compulsory associations 
claiming control over territories and the people within them.  
Administrative, legal, extractive, and coercive organizations are the core 
of any state.22 The Weberian perspective suggests that the state must be 
considered as more than the “government.”  It is the continuous 
administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that attempt not 
only to structure relationships between civil society and public authority 
                                                           
21 Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 165 
22 Skocpol, Theda. Peter B. Evans and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. Bringing the State Back 
In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research. Australia: Cambridge University Press, 
1985. Page 3.  
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in a polity, but also to structure many crucial relationships within civil 
society as well.23 The institutional structure of a state can influence 
private entrepreneurial groups and their role in the future development 
of the state.  As long as the state provides a stable frame of rules so that 
the returns from investment are predictable, private agents will do the 
rest.24 Economic and financial institutions play a significant role in the 
development and subsequent success of a state. It is quite likely that 
economies that are rich choose or can afford better institutions. Perhaps 
more important, economies that are different for a variety of reasons will 
differ both in their institutions and in their income per capita.25  The 
state’s ability to support markets and capitalist accumulation depend on 
the bureaucracy being a corporately coherent entity in which individuals 
see furtherance of corporate goals as the best means of maximizing their 
individual self-interest.  The concentration of expertise in the 
bureaucracy through meritocratic recruitment and the provision of 
opportunities for long-term career rewards are also central to the 
bureaucracy’s effectiveness.26  It is also beneficial to observe the 
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institution structures and activities of states and how they 
unintentionally influence the formations of groups and the political 
capacities, ideas and demands of various sectors of society.27  Social 
scientists have spent the last thirty years trying to maneuver around the 
idea of a neo-utilitarian system and its theories on institution building.  
If historically derived institutional patterns define individual interests 
and constrain the way they are pursued, then “one size fits all” diagnoses 
will not work.28  Measuring a state in comparative historical terms could 
be beneficial in that it is a tradition that takes institutions seriously.29  
However, returning to Weber’s discussion, imposing different policies on 
a separate apparatus without changing the structure of the state will not 
work.  Real changes in policies and behavior depend on the possibility of 
erecting new state structures.30  The relationship between a state’s 
institutions and its society can be either helpful or detrimental to the 
development of that state.  It is social capital built in the interstices 
between state and society that keeps growth on track.31  The mutual 
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development of a state’s political system and institutions combine with 
the certain aspects of a society, such as economic development, leads to 
the healthy development of that state.  When public agents and citizens 
have sufficiently different (but equally necessary) kinds of inputs, they 
can produce more efficiently by combining their efforts than by either 
producing everything privately or everything publicly.32  If the two are 
interconnected in a way that is not conducive to the success of the state, 
it can prevent the state from making any positive changes.  Some states 
are weak because diffused fragments of society have stayed strong, 
retaining at the local level the ability to frustrate state actions.33 
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CHAPTER 2 
PALESTINIAN HISTORY 
The Canaanites and Phillistines 
As early as the third millennium BCE, Palestine existed and was 
inhabited by the Canaanites.  Like most other civilizations during that 
time, the Canaanites existed in several organized city-states, one of 
which was Jericho being the best known.  Around the second millennium 
BCE, during the 14th century, the Canaanite city-states were invaded by 
several groups, two of which were the Hebrews and the Philistines.  The 
Hebrews, together, united several different tribes and called themselves 
Israelites.  They then attempted to gain control of Palestine, but were 
unable to conquer and defeat the Philistines.  The Philistines settled in 
the southern part of Palestine and controlled the Canaanite city of 
Jerusalem.  Around 1050 BCE, the Philistines, with their iron weapons 
and well organized military, fought and defeated the Israelites.  During 
the first millennium BCE, King David of Israel came into Palestine and 
defeated the Philistines.  Over the next couple hundred of years, the 
Israelites became internally divided and were conquered by the 
Assyrians.  Palestine’s Assyrian domination ended with Alexander the 
Great of Macedonia and the destruction of the Second Temple by the 
Romans in 70 CE and the formation of the Jewish diaspora after the 
formation of the autonomous Jewish kingdom of the Hasmoneans, who 
broke free of the Hellenistic kingdoms.  In 313 CE, Palestine became a 
 24 
focus of Roman Emperor Constantine after his conversion to 
Christianity.  Jerusalem and Palestine became a focus as both a 
Christian and Jewish holy site and became a major destination for 
pilgrimage.  By 638 CE, Palestine was invaded and conquered by Muslim 
Arabs who took control of Jerusalem and Palestine.  The takeover of 
Jerusalem was peaceful as the Arabs showed mercy to those they 
conquered and the area came to be known as Filastin.  This would begin 
an era of Muslim control that would last the next 1300 years. 
The Muslim Arabs were interested in Palestine in part because it 
was known that the Prophet Mohammad had initially indicated 
Jerusalem as the first qibla, or direction that Muslims face when they 
pray.  Over time, Jerusalem became the third holiest city in Islam.  The 
Muslims generally did not force their religion or beliefs on the 
Palestinians once they had taken control and it would be centuries before 
a majority of the people in Palestine began to convert to Islam.  The 
remaining Christian and Jewish Palestinians were granted autonomous 
control of their communities and allowed to practice their religion 
because they were viewed as “People of the Book” [ahl al-kitab].  The 
Ottoman Turks overran Palestine in 1516 CE and remained in control 
there until 1917.  During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the 
Ottoman Empire had one of the most powerful militaries in the world.  
Due to their military strength, the Ottoman Empire entered into foreign 
negotiations and economic agreements with an attitude of superiority.  
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However, from the end of the seventeenth century onward, they struggled 
to find their place in a newly changing world as the international 
dynamic shifted around them.  The Ottomans were unable to modernize 
the Empire’s institutions as quickly as other states and they became 
increasingly prone to external interventions by outside powers.  The 
foreign and economic agreements, or Capitulations, that they had made 
with other countries were now being exploited and abused.34  Eventually, 
the Ottoman military became weak and after the Great War they suffered 
a series of defeats.  After World War I, the empire collapsed and was 
replaced by the Turkish Republic, which renounced its claim to the 
Ottoman Arab provinces.      
 
Zionism 
In the decades leading up to the fall of the Ottoman Empire, a 
fervent Jewish ideology began to take root in some parts of Europe that 
came to center on the land of Palestine.  Ever since the expulsion of large 
parts of the Jewish population of Palestine by the Romans after 70 CE, 
some Jews had kept alive the messianic idea of returning to the Holy 
Land. For the purposes of this study, the term “Zionism” refers to the 
ideological belief among Jewish communities that God has destined the 
Jewish people to re-create the fallen kingdom of ancient Israel, otherwise 
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referred to as Zion; and “Zionists” are those who believe that Jews have a 
right to a modern national home in historic Palestine—with the claim to 
this land based on the existence of a Jewish kingdom dating from 
roughly three thousand years ago. These beliefs would later receive 
further justification from perceptions of abiding anti-Semitism and by the 
trauma of the Holocaust.35  
Although the concept of Zionism was always prevalent in Jewish 
life, it was never well-organized, planned or put into action with any 
lasting success.  But the growth of modern nationalist ideas in 
nineteenth-century Europe would change all of that.  In Europe, and 
particularly in Eastern Europe, Jewish communities faced discrimination 
from both their governments and other communal populations.36  They 
were denied entry into certain professions, universities and state 
employment.  Zionism offered a focus and escape and this Zionism that 
they began focusing on was not the old religious Zionism that had been 
passed down generation to generation, this was a new political Zionism 
that was inspired by both religion and modern concepts of nationalism.37  
In 1884, pro-Zionist Jews coordinated themselves under the name Lovers 
of Zion.  They organized for the sole purpose of focusing their efforts on 
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building a Jewish settlement in Palestine.  From the beginning, the new 
political Zionism did look at Palestine as a possible home for their future 
Jewish state.  A booklet by Leo Pinsker was one of the first publications 
that verbalized the new Zionist agenda.  Pinsker explained that anti-
Semitism was so deeply rooted in European culture and society, that no 
matter what steps European governments took to change the laws, it 
would never make any difference.38  He urged European Jews to stop 
waiting for Western culture to change and instead put their efforts 
towards the establishment of an independent Jewish state.  However, it 
is important to know that Pinsker did not insist that this new Jewish 
state be established in Palestine.  Although Pinsker urged young 
European Jews to establish an independent Jewish state, the idea of 
Zionism was still unorganized and did not have a strong leadership or 
sense of direction.  However, it would take the western European figure 
of Theodor Herzl to organize the Zionist ideology and mold it into an 
international movement.  Herzl agreed with Pinsker’s notion that anti-
Semitism was deeply rooted in European society, and he created an 
ideological blueprint for a more explicitly defined form of political 
Zionism.  His main argument in his work, The Jewish State, was that the 
Jewish people constituted a nation but lacked a political state to go with 
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it.39  He explained that the only way for the Jewish people to escape 
persecution was to create an independent sovereign state.  Like Pinsker, 
Herzl did not insist that the new Jewish state be established in Palestine, 
but he was.  After the hundreds of years that a Jewish state had been 
discussed, Herzl was the first to define a clear political objective and 
maneuver the Zionist agenda into a coherent, unified movement.40  
However, Herzl knew, during his lifetime, that the Zionist objective would 
not be achieved without the support of a Great power that would be 
willing to financially assist in their establishment.  
   
British Mandate of Palestine 
When the Ottoman Empire decided to join World War I on the side 
of Germany with the Central Powers, the Allied Powers (Great Britain, 
France and Russia) began discussing how their territories would be 
divided up among themselves in the event of an Allied victory. 
Eventually, this discussion came to be intertwined with the politics of 
Zionism and its perceived role in influencing the outcome of the war. 
Some in the British government thought that the governments of Allied 
powers like Russia were being influenced by Jewish groups. Thus, they 
worried that if Germany came out in support of an independent Jewish 
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state, they might gain enough support to swing the war in favor of the 
Central powers.  Great Britain felt that if it could offer an indication of 
support for the Zionist agenda, then they could retain the support of 
influential Jewish members throughout the world.  Although it is now 
known that this would not have been a decisive factor, it is important to 
understand what drove the British policy at the time. 
 Zionist spokesmen such as Chaim Weizmann in London helped to 
influence the British government in this direction by suggesting that an 
independent Jewish state would serve the imperial interests of Great 
Britain.  There was no question in the minds of early Zionists that their 
desire to create a Jewish state in Palestine could succeed only were it to 
appeal to powerful forces within Western nations, especially Britain.41  If 
Britain sponsored a Jewish state in Palestine once the Ottoman Empire 
lost its sovereignty over the land, it would prevent France from taking 
control of that land to serve their own imperial interests.  All of these 
factors contributed to the eventual decision to extend British support to 
the Zionist agenda in Palestine.  In November of 1917, British foreign 
secretary Arthur Balfour and his cabinet approved and supported a 
Jewish Zionist agenda.  The Balfour Declaration supported a Jewish 
state in Palestine, but at the same time tried to protect the non-Jewish 
communities already established there.  While it was a success for 
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Zionist Jews, the Balfour Declaration was full of contradictions and was 
extremely confusing.42 
 Due to the Balfour Declaration, Palestine’s experience after the fall 
of the Ottoman Empire was much different from that of the other Arab 
territories.  The Palestinian Arab notables that were trying to establish 
and maintain control of Palestine were wary of Great Britain and their 
support of Zionism.43  At that time, the focus became the issue that there 
was a relatively small territory that had been inhabited by Arabs for 
some 1200 years and it was promised, by another state, as the national 
home to another group of people, a majority of whom were Askenazi Jews 
from Europe.  The Palestinian notables resisted working with Great 
Britain and their mandate because they felt that any acceptance of the 
British imperial rule would be misconstrued as Arab support for the 
Balfour Declaration and that it would violate their right to self-
determination they were going to achieve out of the Versailles process. 
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The White Paper 
As Jewish immigration began to swell and Jewish settlements 
became more dominant in Palestine, the tensions rose to violent levels 
between the Arabs and Zionist Jews.   With the outbreak of disturbances 
and riots by the end of the 1920s, Great Britain began investigating the 
conflicts with the formation of the Shaw Commission.  In the fall of 1929, 
Great Britain sent this commission to Palestine to investigate the 
troubles of their mandate and find out why there was so much violence 
in the region.  Shaw concluded that there was a widespread fear among 
the displaced Arab communities that the increasing Jewish immigration 
would create a Jewish-dominated Palestine.44  Shaw recommended that 
the Jewish immigration be reined in by the British government and that 
Arabs should no longer be evicted in the name of land transfers.  
The British government chose to ignore Shaw’s findings and 
decided instead to send another commission into Palestine.  In the 
summer of 1930, the Hope-Simpson Commission visited Palestine and 
presented their findings to the British government in what was referred 
to as the Passfield White Paper.  The White Paper reminded Great Britain 
of its responsibility to both the Arab and Jewish communities as a 
mandatory power.  It suggested that one of Great Britain’s objectives 
should be the establishment of an independent Palestine by 1949, which 
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would include a discussion with the League of Nations to help terminate 
the mandate.  It was expressed that the independent state be one in 
which Arabs and Jews would share in government as to ensure the 
essential interests of each community.  The White Paper also discussed a 
necessary transitional period from the mandate into a state of 
independence.45 However, the recommendations suggested in the While 
Papers were very clear about the involvement of both Jews and Arabs in 
the creation of Palestine’s political system.  If the state was not ready for 
full independent control within the suggested time frame, the White 
Papers explained that both Jewish and Arab heads of state would work 
cooperatively with Great Britain to achieve that end. 
In regard to immigration, it was set forth that Jewish immigration 
to the region needed to be facilitated under suitable conditions.46  In 
theory, Jewish immigration to Palestine was not to exceed the local 
economic capacity or become a burden upon the people of Palestine as a 
whole.47  The White Paper suggested that land be set aside for all of the 
displaced Arabs and noted that Palestine had a limited economic 
capacity; therefore, restrictions needed to be made on Jewish 
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immigration.48  However, it soon became clear that the provisions 
outlined in the White Paper would not be met.  When Zionists were made 
aware of the White Paper, they mounted a large, concerted effort to have 
the document withdrawn altogether.  By 1931, they had succeeded in 
their efforts and the White Paper was stricken from record.  This, in turn, 
demonstrated to the Palestinian Arabs the power and sway that the 
Zionists had over the British government at their own expense.  
Essentially, the White Paper was the beginning of the end.  The British 
Mandate began to spiral down as they would soon no longer have any 
control over the situation in Palestine. 
In April of 1936 riots broke out in Palestine that led to what has 
been historically referred to as the Arab Revolt.  The Arab Palestinians 
began to boycott Jewish goods and businesses and they made demands 
of Great Britain.  These demands included an end to Jewish immigration, 
transfers of land to Jewish owners and a new general government.  The 
conflict and violence continued sporadically for the next three years.  The 
revolt ended with the White Paper of 1939.  The MacDonald White Paper 
was a policy paper in which the idea of partitioning the British Mandate 
of Palestine was abandoned in favor of Jews and Arabs sharing one 
government.  It called for the creation of a unified Palestinian State. Even 
though the White Paper stated that it was committed to the Balfour 
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Declaration, it imposed very substantial limits on both Jewish 
immigration and their ability to purchase land. In terms of the status 
quo, it was a significant defeat for the Jewish side who viewed this as a 
great betrayal of British promises for a Jewish National Homeland in 
Palestine.  However, due to impending World War II, opposition from all 
sides, and the fall of the Chamberlain government, forced the paper into 
the background.  Israel would declare itself an independent state before 
the paper could ever be reviewed again.  
 In the late 1940s, the Zionist movement, that was attempting to 
establish an independent Jewish state of Israel, became wary and tired of 
British control.  Although the Zionist movement had needed the initial 
support of a powerful state, like Great Britain, they were beginning to feel 
limited and betrayed by the control of the British government and they 
wanted to move out from under their shadow.  Moreover, it had always 
been part of the Zionist goals of self-determination to become an 
independent sovereign state free from the control of any country. Thus, 
Jewish groups began actively undertaking acts of rebellion aimed at 
weakening British control over the mandate of Palestine.  By February of 
1947, Britain realized that they had lost control of the situation in 
Palestine and they requested an intervention from the United Nations.  
The UN put together a committee that was in charge of investigating the 
situation in Palestine known as UNSCOP, or the United Nations Special 
Committee on Palestine, which was composed of delegates from 11 
 35 
different nations.49  They arrived in Jerusalem in June of 1947 and spent 
five weeks investigating the situation of ferment in Palestine. As part of 
its conclusions, the recommendations that UNSCOP produced suggested 
the immediate termination of the British mandate and a declaration of 
the independence of Palestine. However, the means by which to 
implement an independent Palestine was a divisive subject among the 
members of the committee. Some felt that Palestine should be formed 
into a unitary federal state, while others felt that a two-state solution, 
one Arab and one Jewish, was the only viable option.  A majority of 
members did conclude that Jerusalem should be categorized as an 
international city, belonging to no one.50  The Zionist leaders initially 
favored the report, while the Arab leaders rejected its conclusions.  
Zionist leaders, including pro-Zionist member states of the UN such as 
the United States, favored the report because it eliminated the British 
mandate and would assure the Zionists a fighting chance at achieving a 
sovereign state.  Great Britain, meanwhile, did not even wait for the 
UNSCOP reports to be released before they withdrew from Palestine 
entirely.  Due to the absence of the British and their refusal to assist in 
the UN partition plan, Palestine was thrown into a state of chaos before 
any attempt to implement the UNSCOP recommendations could take 
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place.  Events on the ground turned into a violent race to see who could 
claim the most land for their group.  Since there was no official transfer 
of power from Great Britain to any sovereign entity as they withdrew 
from Palestine, the struggle for supremacy between the Arab and Jewish 
communities boiled over.  Zionist leaders declared an independent state 
of Israel and explicitly moved in favor of the two-state solution.51  It was 
immediately recognized by both the United States and the Soviet Union. 
 
The War of 1948 
 Around the end of World War II, Arabs made up an absolute 
majority of the population in Palestine and owned close to ninety percent 
of the country’s privately owned land. With the outbreak of the first Arab-
Israeli War in 1947 and 1948, more than half of the country’s Arab 
majority, probably over 750,000 people were expelled from or forced to 
flee the areas that became part of the state of Israel.  About half were 
obliged to depart from their homes before the formal establishment of 
Israel and the entry of several Arab armies into Palestine on May 15; the 
rest left after that date.52   The state of Israel was being established in 
Palestine because European Jews claimed that the land was the site of a 
Hebrew Kingdom, during the first millennium B.C., which they had 
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ancient rights to including the role it played in their self-determination.  
In addition, they wanted to escape discrimination in Europe.  By the 
spring of 1948, the largest Arab cities had been taken over by the Zionist 
militias that would later be reconstituted as the Israeli military, and 
those Palestinians who had fled were turned into refugees.  Often, the 
Palestinians that had fled were the most educated, and had a greater 
share of wealth and status in their former society.  Although they were 
displaced and reduced to refugees, they were only a fraction of the Arabs 
affected by the establishment of the new state.  The outlying villages and 
urban areas that were homes to millions of Arabs became the new homes 
to the displaced Arabs who were forced to move out of the cities when the 
Israeli army came in and destroyed most of their homes.  
In late 1948, after the declaration of Israel as an independent 
state, the surrounding Arab states invaded Israel.  Egypt, Syria, 
Lebanon, Transjordan and Iraq invaded Israel under the idea that they 
were supporting a unified Arab region.53 However, the reality quickly 
became apparent that they also entered Israel for their own mutually-
exclusive and state-specific reasons.  The underlying rivalry between the 
Arab states, paired with a lack of military resources, low numbers of 
trained soldiers and disunity among the Arab combatant states allowed 
for a decisive Israeli victory. In part due to the confusion surrounding 
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this complex early stage of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel denied for 
years that they had any influence in the migration of the Palestinians; 
they claimed that the Palestinian leadership had voluntarily withdrawn 
to join with the Arab states. However, it has been successfully proven in 
more recent historiography of the conflict that Israel did indeed threaten, 
coerce and forcibly expel Palestinian communities from their homes in 
many cases.  
 
The Arab Nations and the Palestinian Issue 
 As a result of the Israeli fight for independence, the existence of 
Israel was not acknowledged or welcomed by any neighboring states.  
The other Arab states of the Middle East felt that Israel was an extension 
of imperialistic Western culture and that Israel planned to suppress Arab 
culture and aid in the cultural corruption by the long arm of the Western 
powers.54  In the following decade, the gradual decline of European 
colonial power saw the Arab states move toward defining their 
sovereignty and acting in the best interest of their individual states.  
They had no interest in playing a role in the Cold War that the United 
States and the Soviet Union had created to further advance their own 
agendas.  However, pragmatism soon dictated that they would be unable 
to avoid it entirely. 
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Around 1954, Egypt came under the authoritarian rule of Gamal 
‘Abd al-Nasir, who advocated a new approach to Egyptian foreign policy.  
He was a leading figure in the Pan-Arab movement aimed at building 
confidence in the Arab states of the Middle East and moving out of the 
shadow of the imperialistic West.  ‘Abd al-Nasir was able to burnish his 
pan-Arab and anti-imperial credentials by forcing Great Britain to 
withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone in Egypt.  After long, structured 
negotiations, Great Britain withdrew from the Suez Canal.  This was an 
example to the Middle East and the rest of the world that negotiations 
were possible without having the alignment with a great power.  While 
the Arab states celebrated ‘Abd al-Nasir’s victory, the European states 
were furious.  In part, however, the Egyptian victory was tied to the fact 
that the Baghdad Pact was being sold, simultaneously, to Middle Eastern 
states by the United States with the idea that their governments would 
accept military and financial aid from the US in an exchange for 
ideological alignment with US and Western thought.55  Egypt ultimately 
rejected the Baghdad Pact, however, and ‘Abd al-Nasir was able to 
convince Jordan and Syria to reject the pact also.  ‘Abd al-Nasir firmly 
believed that the Arab states did not need imperial alliances or Western 
influences to achieve a successful sovereign state.  In addition, it should 
be noted that since the creation of Israel, many of the Palestinian 
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refugees had been forced to the Egyptian-Israeli border and several 
incidents had taken place that had reminded the Egyptian government 
that they did not have a military that could match that of Israel’s.  They 
realized that they would need newer weapons to advance their military, 
and previously, when Egypt had approached the United States for this 
assistance, they were turned away because of their unwillingness to 
cooperate with the Baghdad Pact. 
Still in need of more updated weapons and newer technology, 
Egypt turned to Czechoslovakia to purchase the weapons—which was a 
thinly-veiled move toward the Soviets in western eyes.  Egypt entered 
into a large arms agreement with them in exchange for Egyptian cotton.  
The rest of the world viewed this agreement as Egypt’s alignment with 
Soviet Union.56 
Moreover, at this time Egypt was also aware that they needed more 
money to help in the development of their natural resources to sustain 
their economy.  Egypt decided to implement an idea that had been talked 
about for some time by deciding to build another dam across the Nile.  
This idea was beneficial to the Egyptians because it would demonstrate 
to the world that they had the skill and capacity to implement an 
ambitious and sophisticated development project.  It would also allow for 
an increase in the amount of land that could be irrigated, provide electric 
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power and supply the entire country.57  The only roadblock to this plan 
was the massive funding that was required to make it possible.  Egypt 
was forced to seek financial assistance. 
They received an offer to have the project funded by the United 
States and Great Britain, but both attached provisions and conditions to 
the aid.  While Egypt was considering the offer, the United States 
changed its mind and rescinded its offer of financial assistance 
altogether.  ‘Abd al-Nasir responded with a dramatic move.  On July 26, 
1956, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal and declared that the money 
made off of the canal would go to fund Egyptian projects the West 
refused to sponsor.  The Suez Canal had been built by the Egyptian ruler 
Khedive Isma‘IL in the nineteenth century, but financed by European 
banks and it was owned and operated by the French.  ‘Abd al-Nasir tried 
to resolve this lingering problem by offering financial compensation for 
the Canal.  The Western states reactions to his unilateral action were 
that of fury and hostility. 
In the fall of 1956, international conferences were convened to 
determine a resolution that would be acceptable to all parties, but Great 
Britain, France and Israel had secretly decided upon their own resolution 
to the Suez Canal crisis.58  In late October, Israel launched a military 
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attack into Sinai, and a couple of days later, Great Britain bombed Egypt 
to allow Israeli troops to advance to the Suez Canal itself.  France also 
supported the Israeli attack until a UN-sponsored cease fire was reached.  
All three states were condemned by the international community, 
particularly by the United States and the Soviet Union.  All three were 
forced to withdraw from Egypt because of the terrific pressure to do so on 
the part of both the United States and Soviet Union.  While the Security 
Council did not condemn the tripartite invasion of Egypt because France 
and Great Britain, as permanent council members, enjoyed power of 
veto59, strong pressure from the United States soon forced Israel’s 
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as well. Even then, Israel would not leave 
Egypt for another four months and a UN emergency force had to be 
placed in Gaza to act as a buffer between Israel and Egypt.  The entire 
situation reinforced the Arab notion that Israel was part of a continued 
European colonial agenda and that they would attempt to reverse gains 
made by Arab states at any cost. 
 
The Six-Day War 
Since the establishment of the state in 1948, as a result of various 
conflicts, Israel had expanded its control into various border regions of 
the surrounding Arab nations.  This was a continual source of conflict 
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and hostility with its surrounding neighbors.  Israel had also developed a 
raging insecurity over the possibility of a unified Arab nation and the 
military threat that would come with it.  In the meantime, the Palestinian 
refugees that were forced to live in camps on the Israeli borders were 
becoming increasingly frustrated by the lack of attention to their plight.  
Since the collapse of Palestine, the Palestinian refugees had been 
practically forgotten.  One of the most noteworthy conflicts between 
Israel and the wider Arab world that decisively turned the balance of 
power in favor of Israel was that of the Six-Day War. 
The Six-Day War grew out of the instability that marked the 
armistice lines and state borders that had been drawn to end the fighting 
over the Palestinian land between Israel and the surrounding Arab states 
in the 1940s.  By 1967, Israel’s attempts to violate those lines and 
agreements had been numerous.  Israel would not honor the armistice 
line with Syria as Israel felt that shelling from the Golan Heights was 
threatening and they made several public overtures that military force 
would be used, if necessary, to get what they wanted.  Syria turned to 
Egypt for help and both states remained in constant communication with 
the UN.  In May of 1967, as a response to the full mobilization of the 
Israeli military, Egypt announced that it would close the Straits of Tiran 
to Israeli-flag vessels and to any vessels carrying strategic goods to Israel.  
Egypt said its purpose was to prevent Israel from transporting strategic 
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goods it might use in an attack on Syria.  It cited Israel’s threats against 
Syria and the presumed Israeli troop buildup facing Syria.60 
On June 5, Israel responded to the Egyptian action by launching a 
surprise attack on Egypt, marked by a simultaneous entry into the 
Palestinian area of the Gaza Strip.61  This culminated in the complete 
victory of the Israeli forces on all fronts by June 11.  Jordan attacked 
Israel in response to the attack on Egypt and claimed their right of 
collective self-defense under the UN charter.  Israel did launch attacks on 
both Jordan and Syria and with the help of the United States, they 
swiftly defeated Egypt.  Within days Israel had also taken control of the 
West Bank, the other Palestinian occupied land, in addition to the Gaza 
Strip.  After taking control of the West Bank, Israel renamed the area 
around Jerusalem, Judea and the northern sector as Samaria.  The 
Israeli government granted individual Israelis permission to purchase 
and develop the land.  The Master Plan to incorporate the West Bank into 
Israel aimed to disperse maximally large Jewish population in areas of 
high settlement priority, using small national inputs and in a relatively 
short period by using the settlement potential of the West Bank to 
achieve the incorporation [of the West Bank] into the Israeli national 
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system.62  Although most of the international focus was on the conflict 
with the surrounding Arab nations, the occupation of the Palestinian 
land was a major catalyst for the increasingly agitated Palestinian 
refugees.  
Once Israel had control, Prime Minister Eshkol explained that the 
new areas would remain occupied for security reasons:  “Be under no 
illusion that the State of Israel is prepared to return to the situation that 
reigned up to a week ago…The position that existed until now shall never 
again return”.63  With the Cold War in full swing, an escalating situation 
in Vietnam, and the social discord going on in the United States in the 
forms of war protests and Civil Rights movements, Israel’s oppression of 
the Palestinians did not achieve high-priority status in the international 
community, and when it was addressed, it did not take precedence over 
other global issues going on at the time.  The first anti-Israeli uprising 
occurred immediately following the Israeli victory and occupation in June 
1967.  Subsequently, in 1977 a victory for the Likud party made the 
Israeli government and public much more aggressive about the Jewish 
settlement issue in the occupied territories.  As civil-disobedience 
campaigns in the occupied territories devolved into rebellion in Gaza, the 
Israeli army stepped in, forcefully suppressed the demonstrators, and 
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restored order.64  The defeat in the Six-Day War and the events that 
followed saw Palestinians attempting to find their own voice in all of the 
change that had occurred.  Up until this point, their voice had largely 
been bound into the wider pan-Arab nationalist project and they needed 
new avenues to seek a resolution to their expulsion from their homes 
twenty years before. 
 
Israel and the Palestinian Issue 
By 1986, Yitzhak Rabin was Israel’s Defense Minister and Yitzhak 
Shamir was Israel’s Prime Minister, and together they implemented a 
plan referred to as the “Iron Fist” policy which toughened the treatment 
of Palestinian demonstrators.  During the Israeli elections of 1984 and 
1988, a sufficient number of smaller minor political groups won enough 
seats in the Israeli Knesset to prevent either of the large parties from 
obtaining a workable majority in the government.  The two major Israeli 
political parties remained the Labor Party and Likud Party.  As a result, 
the two parties were forced to work together under a new National Unity 
government.  In reality, the elections created a total paralysis of the 
Israeli political system because the two parties have such opposing views 
and agendas.  The Labor Party remains in favor of territorial compromise 
with the Palestinians, whereas the Likud party continues to be fiercely 
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opposed to relinquishing any control of the West Bank or Gaza Strip.  
During this time, the Israeli government focused on the construction of 
new Jewish settlements in Palestinian controlled areas, and adopted new 
measures of separating and isolating Palestinians in their communities.  
These policies were marked by Israeli government confiscation of Arab 
lands and the arrest and detention of Palestinians suspected of 
participating in political activism.  The new policies required Palestinians 
to carry ID cards and pay specific taxes for the simplest of acts, such as 
crossing the border to go to work or obtain licenses.  The Israeli acts 
heightened Palestinians awareness of their occupied status.  Fearing 
their eradication as a political and social unit, the Palestinians, provoked 
by a relatively minor incident, rose against their Israeli occupiers.65 
In December of 1987, an Israeli military tank hit a truck on its way 
to the Gaza Strip, with four Palestinian workers in it, and all four men 
were killed.  This event triggered an outpouring of rage against all the 
oppression endured by the Palestinians that came to be called the first 
Palestinian Intifada.  The Intifadah, which means “uprising” or “shaking 
off,” for the first time drew world attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
to the plight of the long-forgotten Palestinians living in the Israeli-
occupied territories.66  Palestinians gathered by the thousands to protest 
                                                           
65 Husain, 174 
66 Husain, 174 
 48 
the incident.  The Israeli military responded by shooting and killing 
several Palestinian protestors and the result was widespread revolt 
among the Palestinians.  It was the uprising of the Palestinians against 
the Israeli occupation.  It demanded worldwide attention as to the impact 
of the Israeli occupation and its effects on the Palestinian people.  Images 
of rock-throwing Palestinians confronting Israeli military hardware 
proved to be a very effective message that demonstrated Palestinian 
willingness to oppose Israeli activities against all odds, which did away 
with the idea that the problem was going to go away of its own accord.  
At first the rebellion was spontaneous, but as it gathered 
momentum in both Gaza and the West Bank, the Palestinians came to 
create an underground leadership called the Unified National Leadership.  
The UNL began organizing the uprising while, at the same time, 
supporting the PLO.   The PLO maintained its support as most 
Palestinians remained loyal to the organization and its agenda.  Using its 
position as an umbrella organization, the PLO invited Islamist groups to 
join the uprising. Islamists focused on local masjids, schools, colleges, 
and universities, where Muslim clerics and teachers taught Palestinian 
youth a politically motivated activist Islamic message.  Islamism had 
been growing since the 1970s because of the outcome of revolutions in 
both Iran and Lebanon.  The Palestinians actually felt like they had a 
chance at creating their own state and moving out from the oppressive 
shadow of the Israeli government.  
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However, as the uprising gained popularity, other organizations 
began forming as rivals to the UNL and PLO.  The most significant 
opposition was that of the Islamic Resistance Movement, known more 
commonly as, Hamas.  As an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas 
was composed of Palestinian refugees and young college-educated 
Palestinians.  They began to compete with the UNL for the loyalty and 
support of the Palestinian people. 
A problem with the Intifada was that although the PLO was the 
organization in control, it encompassed several different groups who did 
not always see eye-to-eye on tactics or strategy.  There was no unity or 
cohesion among the different Islamist groups, for instance.  Their lack of 
solidarity made it impossible for them to fully unite all of the 
Palestinians. Moreover, in the wake of the First Intifada, a new major 
international obstacle faced the Palestinians in the form of the outbreak 
of the Gulf War.  Although the initial intensity of the uprising had faded, 
and the Palestinian people were still struggling with its meaning, the Gulf 
War promptly shifted all international attention away from the 
Palestinians and the Arab-Israeli conflict toward Iraq and the Gulf states.  
Any international sympathies that the Palestinians had created were now 
subsumed into the Gulf War and its politics.  
Arafat and the PLO came out in support of Saddam Husayn and 
his invasion of Kuwait, which was a very unpopular international 
position at that time.  Islamist support for Hussein, however, represented 
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no love for the Iraqi dictator’s pan-Arabism or Arab nationalism; it 
represented a more intrinsic rejection of Western intervention in the 
ummah and an attack on “the presence of foreign troops in Saudi 
Arabia,” which defiled “the holiest land for Islam.”67  While the rest of the 
world was focused on the conflict in the Gulf, the Intifada, meanwhile, 
increasingly stagnated.  Before the crisis, the uprising’s impact had been 
receding, and with the outbreak of this new crisis it was eclipsed, though 
it never permanently died out. 
The defeat and weak political position of the Palestinians only 
increased the conflict within the Palestinian community after the end of 
the Gulf War.  The major obstacle facing the Palestinians, from this point 
forward, became their lack of unity and solidarity. Corruption in the 
Palestinian leadership has not helped in overcoming this disadvantage, 
in particular Yasser Arafat’s unwillingness to share power or confront 
growing corruption within the ranks the PLO.  Arafat’s increasing 
autocratic behavior did not allow for the best possible political outcomes 
for the Palestinians.  Arafat brooked no opposition from the elected 
Palestinian Legislative Council, refused for years to sign a Basic Law 
(meant to serve as a transitional constitution) that it had passed, bullied 
the legislators, and generally established the unfortunate precedent of 
serious imbalances between the powers of the executive and legislative 
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branches.68  The lack of sovereignty, absence of concrete law, 
government corruption and continued conflict discouraged any outside 
investment in Palestinian areas, which perpetuated the pattern of 
dependency on external sources for financial support. 
 
The Oslo Peace Accords 
The role of the Oslo Peace Accords has contributed enormously to 
the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, despite its organization 
as a foundation of peace between them.  It was created as a framework in 
which Israel would trade land for peace and negotiate a final "divorce" 
between the two communities. In theory, Oslo envisaged the Israelis' 
progressively transferring portions of the occupied West Bank and Gaza 
Strip to the control of an interim body called the Palestinian Authority 
(PA), the elections for which would include Arafat's previously banned 
Palestine Liberation Organization. The Palestinian Authority would 
guarantee Israel's security by clamping down on terrorism, as both sides 
prepared their people for a final agreement involving a mutual 
recognition of each other's claims to Middle Eastern land that would once 
have been unthinkable.69  The Oslo process had enemies on both sides: 
Israeli right-wingers led by Netanyahu opposed the very principle of 
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trading land for peace and vowed to resist the surrender of any territory 
over which the Israeli flag flew; whereas Islamic fundamentalist 
Palestinians rallied around the Hamas movement to denounce a peace 
agreement that would involve Palestinian and Arab acceptance of Israel's 
right to exist on what was once Palestinian land.70  The result was that 
the Oslo Peace process and U.S. involvement in it has actually hindered 
any Palestinian progress in creating an autonomous state.  Instead, it 
has only given Israel more time to continue occupying Palestinian 
territory and building Jewish settlements.  The growing failure of the 
Oslo Peace Accords fueled support for rejectionist Palestinian groups 
such as Hamas, into taking a more aggressive and violent strategy 
toward Israel.  Many Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories and 
in the diaspora saw the Oslo Peace Process and the Arafat-Rabin 
handshake as a raw deal because Palestinians are worse off today then 
they were in 1993.  The Arafat-Rabin peace agreements brought new 
recruits into the ranks of Revolutionary Islamist Palestinian 
organizations such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.71 
At the Oslo Peace Process, in Washington D.C., Yasser Arafat was 
there representing the Palestinian people through his position as the 
leader of the PLO and the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, was 
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representing the state of Israel.  Rabin committed Israel to the 
discontinuation of building Jewish settlements in the Occupied 
Territories.  This was a commitment that many Israelis were not willing 
or prepared to make, and when Benjamin Netanyahu became Prime 
Minister shortly thereafter, he violated the agreement and resumed 
building and expanding Jewish settlements.  On the other hand, the Oslo 
Peace process demonstrated to the world how unprepared and ill-
equipped the PLO was to negotiate with Israel for their independent 
state.  This has been a problem that has plagued Palestinians with their 
international negotiations from the beginning.  In regards to the Oslo 
Accords, it became particularly acute at the moment when the PLO 
leadership in 1992-93 in effect took negotiations with Israel out of the 
hands of the relatively competent delegation of generally respected 
figures from the occupied territories and others from the Palestinian 
diaspora that they had chosen and sent to Washington. Instead, they 
placed it instead in the hands of the team of loyal PLO officials that they 
appointed to negotiate the Oslo Accords, while calling all the shots from 
Tunis.72  Had a more competent, less corrupt group of Palestinian 
leaders attended that Oslo Peace Process, perhaps the Israel and the 
United States would not have gotten away with as much as they did.  As 
a result of U.S. involvement in the Oslo Peace process, and their 
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unwavering support for Israel, the Peace process only addressed minor 
issues that existed between Israel and the PLO.  The United States and 
Israel purposefully left major issues, such as Palestinian sovereignty, 
Jerusalem, Palestinian statehood and refugees, off the table for 
discussion during the entirety of the so called Peace Process.  In fact, the 
real logic of the partial interim approach was that it was intended by its 
Israeli and American architects to relieve Israel of having to make any 
hard decisions on ending the occupation and settlement of the West 
Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem.  Instead, Israeli occupation and 
settlement were massively reinforced during the period of negotiations.73  
It is for these reasons, and many other, that so many Palestinians were 
angered and displeased with the Oslo Peace Process.  The Oslo Peace 
Accords and the United States involvement, particularly on behalf of 
Israel, is another factor in the Israeli, Palestinian conflict.   
By July of 2000, it had become clear to Palestinians and the rest of 
the world that a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict over state 
sovereignty was nowhere close to being solved.  It had been almost a 
decade since the Camp David Accords and it was abundantly clear that 
the Oslo Peace process had failed.  Fueled not only by the failure of the 
peace process and the continued development of Jewish settlements, the 
Palestinians became deeply offended, in September of 2000, when Israeli 
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opposition leader, Ariel Sharon, visited the site of Al-Aqsa Mosque and 
walked among its ruins, since the mosque was located in East Jerusalem 
and it is extremely sacred to Palestinian Muslims.  It is also referred to as 
the Temple Mount by the Zionists and it is a disputed area between the 
Palestinians and Israelis.  This calculated act of perceived disrespect on 
Sharon’s part triggered the second Palestinian Intifada, also referred to 
as the Al-Aqsa Intifada.  This Intifada lasted until the winter of 2005 in 
an exchange of violence between the Palestinians and the Israeli military.  
Images of Palestinian children being gunned down and killed by the 
Israeli military were matched with images of Palestinian suicide bombers 
killing unarmed citizens at a time in Jerusalem.  To the wider world, this 
was the picture being painted.  Palestinians were armed with their stones 
as they fought a military that is backed and funded by the most powerful 
military in the world.  The Al-Aqsa Intifada turned the international 
spotlight back on the Palestinians and their never ending struggle with 
the Israeli government.  
 Since the second Intifada, Palestinians have re-entered global 
headlines for their election of the Islamist rejectionist group Hamas into 
the government of the Palestinian Authority.  Hamas’ representation of 
the Gaza Strip further limited the flow of international aid and money 
supplied to the Palestinian people. Inability to stem continued violence 
culminated in Hamas launching missile attacks into Israel.  On 
December 27, 2008, Israel launched a major military campaign dubbed 
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“Operation Cast Lead” against Hamas in the Gaza Strip.  The Israeli 
offensive came in response to markedly increased Palestinian rocket fire 
following the expiration of a six-month cease-fire on December 19, 
followed by a ground offensive into Gaza. Despite international pressure 
to halt the fighting (including the passage of U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 1860 on January 8), the conflict continued until January 18, 
when Israel unilaterally issued a cease-fire and Hamas followed suit 
shortly thereafter.  Israel’s technological superiority and reliance on 
heavy armor and firepower contributed to a wide disparity in casualties—
approximately 1,440 Palestinians died (with some organizations 
estimating that at least half of the dead are civilians), as compared with 
13 dead (including four civilians) on the Israeli side.74 International 
attention has turned to brokering a sustainable cease-fire arrangement 
and to addressing the needs of the Gazan population—both in terms of 
continued humanitarian assistance and of reconstruction.75 However, 
this work contends that instead of trying to rebuild the Gaza Strip and 
focus on reconstruction, it would be more beneficial to focus on the 
reconstruction of a Palestinian state, and it is to that which we must now 
turn. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ISSUES 
Palestinian Political Structure 
One of the major obstacles facing the Palestinians is their internal 
conflict over contemporary political issues.  Palestinians find themselves 
engaged in an ideological battle with Palestinian political groups such as 
Fatah, Hamas and the PLO.  A controversial issue is their situation with 
Israel and the status of their independent state.  Each political group has 
a different philosophy and roadmap as to how to achieve that end.  It 
pulls the Palestinians in different directions and prevents a sense of 
unity.  To better understand the conflict, it is important to understand 
the history and roles of the political players.  
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was 
established on December 11, 1967, six months after the end of the Six 
Day War. PFLP's founder and General Secretary was George Habash.76  
Habash's leadership of PFLP was supplemented by Wadi' Haddad. Both 
men were medical doctors who helped found the Arab Nationalist 
Movement, a Pan Arab and Arab Socialist initiative seeking to destroy 
Israel and to create, in its stead, a secular, socialist Palestinian 
nation. In its fledgling stage, PFLP enjoyed the support of then-Egyptian 
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President Gamal Abdul Nasser.77  In 1968, PFLP joined the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) and quickly became its second-largest 
faction (behind Fatah); but unlike Fatah, which sought support from 
Arab nations, PFLP looked to Russia and China for assistance.  Blending 
Palestinian nationalism with Marxist ideology, PFLP describes itself as "a 
progressive vanguard organization of the Palestinian working class 
dedicated to liberating all of Palestine and establishing a democratic 
socialist Palestinian state."78 Today, the PFLP has approximately 800 
registered members and is headquartered in Syria. 
Palestine Liberation Organization 
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was created in 1964. 
The PLO was founded at a congress in the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem 
in May. Formed as an umbrella organization by refugee groups and 
fedayeen (Arab., “commando”) forces, such as Al Fatah, Al Saiqa, and the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, it was also joined by 
professional, labor, and student associations, as well as some individual 
members; the fedayeen, however, have always dominated it.  The 
functions of the PLO are carried out by three main organs: the Executive 
Committee, a decision-making body in which the major fedayeen groups 
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are represented; the Central Committee, an advisory body; and the 
Palestine National Council, which is seen as an assembly of the 
Palestinian people.79   For several years it was viewed as the responsible, 
mature, state-like framework that they had lacked throughout their 
modern history, operating as the almost universally accepted 
representative of the Palestinian people.80  It was created to unify the 
fractured voices of the Palestinians and represent their interests towards 
the creation of their state.  Several different political groups belonged to 
the PLO, but since it’s inception it has been controlled by Fatah.  The 
PLO deserves credit, wholly or partially, in three major areas of 
achievement for the Palestinians.  The first achievement is for creating a 
vehicle for the pursuit of their national aims that was universally 
accepted among the entirety of the Palestinian people.  The creation of an 
accepted forum grouping all major Palestinian political forces was 
something that no earlier Palestinian political leadership had been able 
to achieve.81 For decades, the PLO was the face of the Palestinian 
national movement.  The second achievement attributed to the PLO is 
the recognition of the Palestinian people by the Arab states and later by 
the international community.  Starting in the early 1970’s, the PLO was 
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recognized by the Arab League, the United Nations, and eventually, after 
decades of foot-dragging, even by Israel and the United States as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.82 The PLO forced the 
world to legitimize the Palestinian people.  As a result, the international 
recognition of the Palestinians and the PLO should be able to influence 
global policy that represents the rights of the Palestinian people.  This 
will only be the case, however, if the PLO does not succumb to the 
demands of those who hope to minimize the interests of the Palestinians.  
The PLO has also been credited with its recognition of the ultimate 
futility of exile politics, and to make the difficult decision to shift its 
center of gravity from the countries bordering Israel to the occupied 
territories.83 This tactic was implemented while simultaneously 
suggesting a two-state solution to the conflict with Israel and was 
executed after the Oslo Peace Accords.  While the PLO has made several 
advances for the Palestinian community, it has also had its share of 
turmoil and political losses. 
Fatah 
Fatah has been extremely dominant in the PLO’s existence.  Fatah 
was created in the late 1950’s by Arab leaders such as Yasser Arafat and 
Khalil al-Wazir.  It was a political and military organization initially set 
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up as the Palestine National Liberation Movement.  One of Fatah’s goals 
was to wrestle Palestine away from Israel’s military control through 
guerilla warfare.  Fatah was accepted by the Palestinians in the 1950s 
and 1960s due to their insistent preaching of direct, armed action 
against Israel, combined with its independence from Arab governments.84  
Fatah was the strongest and most organized of the underground 
Palestinian political groups.  They were accepted by the Palestinians 
because their initial goal was to secure a Palestinian state and rescue the 
Palestinians from the Israeli control.  It was not until the fifth session of 
the Palestine National Council in February of 1969 that Arafat, the leader 
of Fatah, was elected chairman of the PLO’s executive committee.  Fatah 
then took a majority of the seats on the board that had been reserved for 
guerilla organizations.  This move placed Fatah in political control where 
it has remained since.  Although Fatah created and held a monopoly in 
Palestinian politics for several years, they failed to create unity and 
discipline throughout the Palestinian political movement.  The need for 
power and control by Arafat and his upper level leaders, blurred and 
eventually buried the original intent of Fatah thus leaving the door wide 
open for other political groups, such as Hamas, to walk in and take 
control with the support of the Palestinian masses.  
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Yasser Arafat and his role in Palestinian politics are important 
because he was a major player in the Palestinians struggle for 
independence since the creation of Israel.  Arafat was born in the late 
1920’s, in Cairo.  Both his mother and father were Palestinians.  
Throughout his childhood he moved between Egypt and Jerusalem and 
by the time he was in his late teens he was smuggling weapons into 
Israel to support the uprising of the Palestinian people.  Arafat lived 
several places after he received his education including; Jordan, Kuwait, 
Egypt and Lebanon.  After gaining control of the PLO, Arafat and the rest 
of the PLO leaders would relocate to different Arab states when 
necessary.  During the Oslo Peace Accords Arafat was appointed the 
leader of the Palestinian Authority.  He was in control of the PA from its 
inception.  When Arafat gave a speech that renounced terrorism and 
accepted Israel’s right to exist, he won the Nobel Peace Award for his 
gesture of peace with the Israelis.  The problem with Arafat was that as 
the years went on he became increasingly autocratic and ran the 
Palestinian Authority like a Dictatorship.  His self serving ideas and 
agendas in cooperation with a very conservative Israeli government put a 
halt to any progress in the creation of a Palestinian state.   
The Palestinian Authority 
 The Palestinian Authority (PA) was created in September of 1993 at 
the Oslo Peace Accord in Washington D.C.  The Oslo Peace Accord was 
an attempt by the Clinton administration to create a peace deal between 
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Israel and Palestine.  The Palestinian Authority is a legislative council 
and interim self-governing body responsible for the areas of the Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank which fall under Palestinian control.  It was at 
this time that Israel formally recognized the PLO as representatives of the 
Palestinian people and granted the Palestinians limited autonomy in the 
area of Gaza.  The PA was to exercise complete civil and security control 
in three different zones of the West Bank as defined and divided by 
Israel.85  At the time, the PA was largely viewed as a major success for 
the Palestinian people.  However, their success would be short lived.  
Today, the PA is used to describe the ineffectiveness and corruption of 
the Palestinian political establishment.  The PA leadership failed to do 
much of what it could have done on its own, even in such impossibly 
restrictive circumstances.  This includes establishing a corruption-free 
system of governance based on a rule of law, establishing a balance 
between the executive and legislative branches, attracting massive 
investment, and creating jobs.86  It is also important to know that the PA 
was created under the guise of the United States, with Israeli support, 
and has been limited by those political actors.  The PA has continuously 
had to answer and succumb to the wishes of both the United States and 
Israel.  The political pressure and interference of these states 
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demonstrated the PLO’s inexperience and inability to deal with outside 
actors.  The first decade of the existence of the PA has been testimony to 
the unpreparedness of the PLO leadership for the duties attendant on 
creating a real state.  It is true that the PLO leaders who dominated the 
PA, such as Arafat, were severely inhibited by Israel’s overwhelming 
power.  In addition, the restrictions written into the Oslo Accords, to 
which they themselves had consented, prevented them from obtaining 
sovereignty, statehood, or even jurisdiction and real control in most of 
the occupied territories. When the PA was established it failed to create a 
solid framework for the rule of law, a constitutional system, a balance of 
powers, and many of the other building blocks of a modern state.87  In 
addition to that, more complications arose when it was immediately 
turned over to and controlled by Yasser Arafat.  In January 1996, radical 
Islamist parties, who did not support the Oslo Peace process, boycotted 
scheduled Palestinian elections: this effectively threw the PA entirely into 
Arafat’s hands.  Arafat was elected president of the Palestinian Authority, 
and his supporters won two-thirds of the eighty seats in the Palestine 
Legislative Council.88  He now had control of all three major Palestinian 
political entities; the PLO, Fatah, and finally the PA.  Arafat’s increasing 
autocratic behavior was not yielding the best possible political outcomes 
                                                           
87 Khalidi, 159 
88 Husain, 185 
 65 
for the Palestinians.  Arafat brooked no opposition from the elected 
Palestinian Legislative Council, refused for years to sign a Basic Law that 
the PA had passed, bullied the legislators, and generally established the 
unfortunate precedent of a serious imbalance between the powers of the 
executive and legislative branches.89  The lack of sovereignty, absence of 
concrete law, government corruption and war discouraged private 
investors from investing in Palestinian areas.  This lack of investment 
has led to a weak economic system and a dependency on other nations 
for financial support.  However, in spite of the numerous 
disappointments and downfalls of the PA, there is a reason it is still 
around.  The Palestinians need some sort of political entity, corrupt or 
not, to help fulfill their ultimate goal of achieving an independent 
Palestinian state.  For Palestinians, the PLO and PA symbolize their 
national aspirations; to abandon them is to abandon hope for an 
independent state.90  This Palestinian attitude will help to explain why 
Hamas became involved in the corrupt political system. 
Hamas 
Hamas was created around 1988, during the first Intifada, as an 
offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.  It was created to allow members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in the Intifada.  Shaykh Ahmed 
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Yassin, the founder, believed in the idea of defying Western powers and 
ideals and believed that Palestinian Muslims should actively fight for an 
Islamic state of Palestine. Hamas was also created, in part, as a reaction 
to the ineffectiveness of the PLO since the 1967 conflict with Israel.  The 
PLO’s position of all talk and no action against Israel, and the Israeli 
agenda to dominate Palestinians and their land, led to the formation of 
Hamas who wanted the opportunity to represent Palestinians interests.  
Hamas set out with an agenda separate from that of the PLO; they 
wanted to recognize the Palestinian refugees and their needs.  Hamas 
was able to gain the support of refugees by focusing on social policies 
and the liberation of Palestine from Israel.  A one state solution of a 
Palestinian state, which is embraced by Hamas, calls for the removal of 
all Zionist Jews.  Arab Jews that lived in Palestine before the creation of 
Israel are able to remain.  Hamas built itself on an Islamic 
fundamentalist program, which, on the issues of Palestine, is an Islamic 
version of the maximalist program that Arab nationalism and Palestinian 
nationalism used to uphold in the 1950s-that is, an Islamic Palestinian 
state on the whole of Palestine, from which nonindigenous Jews should 
leave.91  Hamas is organized into two sectors; military and political.  The 
political component focuses on humanitarian needs and tends to be 
diplomatic.  In a genuine spirit of caring for fellow Palestinians, Hamas 
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has helped to build schools, charity organizations, hospitals and 
religious institutions.  The role of the military is much more problematic.  
Hamas has resorted to suicide bombing as a military strategy to get the 
attention of Israel and the rest of the International community.  It is this 
strategy that has resulted in the United States title of Hamas as a 
“terrorist organization”.  However, suicide bombing can be an effective 
military strategy as it can command wanted attention.  Suicide attacks 
are designed to achieve specific political purposes: to coerce a target 
government to change policy, to mobilize additional recruits and financial 
support or both.92 This could become a potential problem as suicide 
bombing can become ineffective as it has the probability to deliver 
diminishing returns.  The Western media tends to focus on the military 
side and less on the humanitarian efforts.  The biased attention sheds a 
negative light on Hamas and helps to contribute to a skewed perception 
of the group.  While Hamas has demanded and received recognition, it 
has yet to influence any serious policy change.  An alternative would be 
to gain legitimate, political momentum which is what seems to be 
happening as is evident by the 2006 Palestinian elections.  In 2006, 
Hamas received landslide victories in the Palestinian Authority over 
Fatah.  A struggle for power has since ensued between Hamas and 
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Fatah.  Hamas has refused to recognize Israel as a legitimate state and 
they do not practice nonviolence, as Fatah has done in the recent past.  
Hamas has used its own, newly acquired, legitimacy to pursue a new 
Palestinian agenda.  They have offered Israel a ten year cease fire 
agreement for a return to the 1967 borders which would give the 
Palestinians back Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem.  Hamas 
does not accept Israel’s establishment of Jewish homes in previously 
occupied Palestinian homes.  Under Hamas, the Palestinian position is 
as equally passionate about the removal of Zionist Jews as the Israelis 
are of establishing a completely Zionist state.  This, of course, threatens 
Israel’s very existence and is not very conducive to the creation of a 
timely resolution.  
 
Hamas vs. Fatah: Competition for Control 
The subsequent corruption of political groups such as Fatah and 
the PLO and the death of Yasser Arafat in the fall of 2004, have led 
Hamas to the center stage in Palestinian politics.  The 2006 elections 
gave Hamas a voice in the PA, much to the disappointment of Fatah.  
Fatah had been the hegemonic political force in Palestinian politics for 
decades.  After the political corruption and the death of Arafat, Fatah 
was practically paralyzed in the 2006 elections.  The corrupt reputation 
Fatah maintained led to the demise of its legitimacy as the 3 million 
Palestinians that were in their control lost faith and instead turned 
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towards Hamas.  Hamas and other smaller Islamist rival groups 
represent the initial ideals of Fatah.  Fatah was given the opportunity to 
lead and protect the Palestinian interests and instead became wrapped 
up in power and control. They dominated the political arena and 
remained uncontested for years, until the political emergence of Hamas.  
Hamas realized that the only way they were going to be effective or 
legitimized was to “embrace” the PA and gain partial and eventually 
majority control.  However, this division of Palestinian interests and fight 
for control is not beneficial for the overall goal of Palestinian autonomy 
and a Palestinian state.  Struggles over the most fundamental issues of 
politics and state forms will continue until relatively stable new state 
organizations have been consolidated; thereafter political struggles 
continue about how to use state power in its broadly established form.93  
Even if Hamas has partial control of the PA, if political agendas are not 
carried out in a more conducive manner to the Palestinian goals, a 
Hamas led PA will be as ineffective as a Fatah led PA.  
 
Hamas and Israel: Confrontation and Resistance 
 Although Hamas is presently being embraced by a majority of 
displaced Palestinians, Israel is doing everything it can to discredit the 
political group and have them replaced or eliminated.  Israel wants to 
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push forward with their illegal Jewish settlements and Zionist agenda 
without any Palestinian or global interference.  Hamas is making this 
almost impossible for Israel. Since the emergence of Hamas, as a radical 
Islamic group, Israel has been criticized about its illegal pursuit of the 
Palestinian occupied land particularly in the areas of Gaza and the West 
Bank.  Hamas has been very upfront and honest about its solution to the 
Israeli Zionist agenda.   According to Yassin, Hamas portrayed itself as 
the Muslim answer to Jewish Zionism. Palestinian Muslims were obliged 
to undertake a jihad against the Israeli occupiers, who had usurped 
Muslim land.94  Yassin’s view is remarkably similar to the Zionist 
ideology, which views the same land as a divine trust granted to the 
Jewish people for all time.95  The entire conflict between Israel and the 
Palestinians is about who has the right to the land?  Whether a two state 
solution is ever agreed upon, either returning to the 1949 Armistice Lines 
or to the 1967 borders, the question of who is entitled to the land is 
something that Muslims and Jews will disagree on for years to come.  
This is due in large part to the rivalry between the two groups.  Relations 
between rivals have been argued to more conflictual than relations 
between other types of states, largely because of the distrust and 
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hostility that are said to characterize rivalry.96  However, their 
disagreement should not prevent the right of two independent, sovereign 
nations to coexist close to one another.  
 
The United States and the Palestinian Issue 
  In the establishment of a Palestinian state, the role of the United 
States and the Western world has been to support the state of Israel.  
There is an impression that the United States is so preoccupied with 
furthering its own interests that it is insensitive to the needs and 
aspirations of broad population segments in the Middle East.  This lack 
of regard for popular opinion is potentially counterproductive to U.S. 
interests in that it promotes anti-American attitudes that can destabilize 
or even topple governments aligned with Washington.97  The United 
States relationship with Israel is unsettling to surrounding Arab nations.  
The U.S. supports Israel by providing them with military weapons and 
technology, billions of dollars every year and continuous international 
influence and support.  Every U.S. presidential administration continues 
to do this to obtain and maintain the Jewish vote and appease their 
Jewish constituents.  If a candidate, who ran for any U.S. office, did not 
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publicly support the state of Israel they could have a difficult time being 
elected to office.  It would be controversial for a candidate to support a 
two state solution that would return Israel and Palestine back to the 
1967 borders.  This is a reality because a majority of Americans are 
ignorant to the events going on in Israel.  All they know is what the 
media tells them.  Since the media tends to support Israel, most 
Americans support Israel.  If more Americans were actually informed 
about the reality of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, chances are they 
would be less likely to blindly support Israel and then candidates that 
support a two state solution would actually have the opportunity to be 
elected to office.   
 
The UN and the Palestinian Issue 
The United Nations and the international community typically 
support Israel because the United States has the largest voice in the UN.  
The U.S. also holds the power of veto.  Even if a majority of states 
belonging to the UN wanted to support a major Palestinian movement, 
they would be vetoed by the United States.  However, the UN has done 
many things to support the Palestinians.  When Israel was applying for 
admission into the UN in the late 1940s, the UN was very wary of 
accepting them.  The UN even turned down Israel’s initial application.  
Several months later, when Israel resubmitted their intent to join the UN, 
the UN Security Council granted their application, but the General 
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Assembly was, again, much wearier to accept.  A major concern was that 
Israel would not meet Article 4 of the UN charter which mandates that all 
nations who join must be a peace-loving state.  However, Israel was 
granted membership to the UN under addressed stipulations that the 
Palestinian question be resolved and be resolved quickly and fairly.  Over 
the years, the UN has created several committees with an aim of 
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Some of the UN committees 
that have been formed are; Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable 
Rights of the Palestinian People, Palestine Commission, Palestine 
Conciliation Commission, Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East, Special Committee on Palestine, Special Committee to 
Investigate Israeli Practice Affecting the Human Rights of the Population 
of the Occupied Territories, and many more.  If the UN were able to 
exercise their right as a collective, global entity without the interference 
of other nations, they would probably be able to assist in resolving this 
conflict.  With the help of the UN and a practice of nonviolence, Israel 
and the Palestinians could take the steps to resolve the current situation.  
The elected Palestinian political groups could then receive humanitarian 
and financial aid and properly rebuild their broken communities.  
However, the distrust Palestinians have for the Israeli government is to 
be expected, Israel has not followed through on a single commitment 
since its establishment in 1948.  The international community needs to 
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recognize that and provide the proper support to both sides as long as 
each side is honoring their commitment.   
 
Arab States and the Palestinian Issue  
 Middle Eastern involvement from other Arab states has played a 
large role in the political development of the Palestinians and their 
political relationship with Israel.  After the creation of Israel, their role 
was much larger than it is today.  After Israel was created, Arab states 
were doing whatever they could to preserve their culture.  They did not 
want the influence of the Western world or to be controlled by it.  To gain 
control over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Israel engaged in conflict 
with both Egypt and Transjordan and other Arab states such as Lebanon 
and Syria.  However, although there might have been an initial rally by 
Arab nations on behalf of the Palestinians, there were other reasons for 
the Arab unity.  While Egypt, Syria and Jordan have warred with Israel 
ostensibly in the name of the Palestinian plight, Palestinians recognize 
that Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian motives are not altruistic.  National 
interests motivate the actions of the Arab states neighboring Israel.  
Their promotion of the Palestinian cause is often symbolic.  It rarely 
takes the form of substantive economic or military assistance.98  The 
Middle East, as a region, is politically fractured thus contributing to the 
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confusion and discourse of a legitimized Palestinian state.  The weakness 
was shown most obviously in regard to what all Arab peoples regarded as 
their common problem: that of Israel and the fate of the Palestinians.99  
Overall, involvement by outside Arab states on behalf of the Palestinian 
people has had nothing but a negative affect on the Palestinian agenda.  
An overarching question is why can’t the Middle East, as a region, 
wrestle Israel away from the Jews and help the Palestinians create an 
autonomous state?  That these twenty-one states-which posses almost 
two-thirds of the world’s proven oil reserves, now number 260 million 
people and have several million men under arms-have not been able to 
gain the upper hand diplomatically or militarily against Israel, to say 
nothing of regaining all of the West Bank and Gaza, attests to the fact 
that the Arab states have not really united behind the Palestinians.  
From the moment Jewish settlement began to pose a serious threat to 
Palestinians, Arab leaders sought to gain advantage for themselves and 
their states out of the confrontation between those two peoples.100 Just 
as the Arab states have hesitated to dedicate themselves to the military 
objective of ‘liberating Palestine,’ so have they been unable to coordinate 
diplomatic strategies to that end.101  The political insecurities of the 
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region create a “survival of the fittest” attitude for many Arab states.  
Most are trying to maintain their own sovereignty and autonomy.  Some 
have suggested that for Arab regimes, the Palestinian cause is merely a 
pawn in inter-Arab rivalry.102  After the establishment of Israel, Egypt 
and Transjordan struggled to maintain control of Gaza and the West 
Bank.  They were weak militarily and did not have access to the type of 
funds that Israel did and their governments were being thrown into 
turmoil as they were losing their legitimacy with the people.  Also, with 
the United States backing Israel, many Arab states did not, at that time, 
want to engage in conflict with the United States.  Arab states are aware 
that selfless national dedication to the Palestinian cause would lead 
immediately to a confrontation with Israel that no Arab state could win 
alone, even with the support of several others.103  On the other hand, 
leaders of the Arab states hope a favorable resolution of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict might emerge, but they are reluctant to take great risks to 
achieve that end.104  A focus on Palestinian involvement and action with 
other Arab nations shows a detrimental effect to their political agenda.  
As a result of their position during the Gulf War, the PLO, Hamas, and 
other Palestinian organizations paid dearly for the so-called “principled 
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position” that the Palestinians took during the Gulf crisis.105  Financial 
aid from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia ended and thousands of Palestinian 
workers and students were expelled from the Persian Gulf, forcing them 
to return to occupied territories where there was no money or jobs or 
homes.  In addition, it contributed to the crowding and overpopulation of 
the area.  The dysfunctional relationship that was created and continues 
between the Palestinian people and the surrounding Arab states 
contributes to Israel’s success in the area.  Were the involved Arab states 
more stable and legitimized, both regionally and internationally, the 
Palestinian agenda of a sovereign Palestinian state would have been 
achieved by now.  
 
Israel and the Current Palestinian Conflict 
 Israel plays a major role in the current conflict with the 
Palestinians.  The policies and agendas that they implement contribute 
to the civil unrest between the Palestinians and Israelis.  Israel’s main 
political agenda is to maintain their Jewish state.  They are doing 
everything in their power to protect their sovereign, Zionist interests.  
They have made it abundantly clear that they are not going to allow 
anyone or anything to stand in the way of their Zionist state, even if that 
means expanding into new territory.  However, not all Israelis support 
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the current Zionist agenda.  There are Israelis that support a two state 
solution and want to see the establishment of a Palestinian state.  
Israel’s internal political conflict is over the establishment of a 
Palestinian state.  There are three major Israeli political parties that are 
all founded on a Zionist platform, but they differ from one another in 
their Zionist agendas.  The three major parties are: center-left Labor, 
center-right Likud, and centrist Kadima.106  The conservative party, 
Likud, supports the expansion of the Jewish settlements into the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip.  Conservative Israelis support anything that 
expands the state of Israel and fulfills their Zionist obligation to God.  
Likud emphasizes the belief that peace can only come when groups such 
as Hamas and Hezbollah are dismantled. The party is now led by former 
(and current) Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.107   The liberal party, 
Labor, is more sympathetic to the Palestinian people.  In recent years, 
Labor has argued for increasing the minimum wage and emphasizing 
social democratic policies, while pushing for negotiations with Israel’s 
Arab neighbors.  The most famous Labor politician is Yitzhak Rabin, who 
signed the Oslo Accords and the Israel-Jordan Treaty, and won the Nobel 
Peace Prize with Yasser Arafat and Shimon Peres before being 
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assassinated.108  Kadima is the newest Israeli political party that was 
established in 2005 by former Likud party member, Ariel Sharon.  
Kadima's official platform combines traditional rightwing rhetoric--the 
Jewish people's right to the undivided Land of Israel--with pragmatic 
policies on peace and security: a negotiated settlement and the creation 
of a Palestinian state. Yet this leftist tendency is matched by a 
unilateralist and expansionist agenda more reminiscent of traditional 
Likud attitudes.109 The undisputable division of the Israeli political 
community is testament to the internal friction due to the Palestinian 
question. 
 Nonetheless, Israel has had the oversight to create, establish and 
maintain a series of policies that both protect it from outside threats and 
simultaneously control the surrounding Palestinian community.  The 
implementation of these policies has severely limited the Palestinians 
ability to do anything.  Israel’s position has been to control the 
Palestinians to help eliminate the threat they feel for their own 
independent state.  One of the first policies that were implemented by the 
Israelis on the Palestinians was a system of martial law.  The Defense 
Emergency Regulations provided a full set of regulations for martial law 
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rule, and the government imposed martial law.110 Israeli martial law 
included a curfew for all Palestinians, a travel permit for any Arab 
traveling out of their home village and military checkpoints to enforce the 
travel permits.  It fined or imprisoned Arabs found without a pass, or 
with an expired pass, or on a route different from that prescribed in the 
pass.111 The martial law over the Arabs is a colonial regime enforced by 
colonial law.112 Another policy that Israel established was the Absentee’s 
Property Law.  This law, adopted in 1950, permitted confiscation of the 
land of a person deemed an ‘absentee.’  It defined ‘absentee’ to include 
any Palestinian who in 1948 left the land to go either to another state or 
to an area of Palestine held by Arab League Forces.113 This policy allowed 
the Israeli government to make large land claims and begin their Zionist 
expansion with the establishment of Jewish settlements.  It also 
contributed to the refugee problem and encouraged a negative response 
from the Palestinian community.  The situation only compounded in 
1953 when the Land Acquisition Law passed and the Israeli government 
was given title to all of the absentee land.  Economically, Israel also hit 
the Palestinians hard.  The government sequestered as enemy property, 
the bank accounts of expelled Arabs, saying it would release them only if 
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the Arab states would make peace with Israel.114 The Arab families that 
had fled during the 1948 war, no longer had ownership of their homes 
and land, but also no access to their money.  Once the Palestinian 
communities had been established in Gaza and the West Bank, Israel 
would pump money into cities, but only into the Jewish sectors.  The 
Arab sectors, sometimes the most impoverished, received no financial aid 
or funding.  Arab towns and villages struggle because it is Israeli policy 
to deny the foundations of a solid infrastructure, such as roads, sewage 
lines or communication systems.  Education is another area where 
Israelis spend more money per student for Jewish students over Arab 
students.115 All of the Israeli policies that have hindered and slowed 
down the Palestinian people are the same policies that are fueling the 
violent state of affairs they find themselves engaged in now.  The 
underlying fear for Israel is the safety of their state.  It is what is 
preventing a solution to the Arab-Palestinian conflict.  If Israel could 
unite politically with one agenda and they could recognize the civil rights 
of others, a solution could be reached with the Palestinians. 
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CHAPTER 4 
STATE BUILDING: THE SEARCH FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE 
 For the Palestinians to be able to create a strong and independent 
state, time and attention needs to be focused on their infrastructure.  
What fundamental aspects of a state do the Palestinians already have 
and what aspects do they lack?  An observation of road systems, 
communication systems, schools, sewage systems, natural resources and 
land are all necessary to measure the viability of a successful Palestinian 
state.  It is also important to assess the Palestinians, as a people and 
culture and examine their role in the state building process.  The 
Palestinian economy is also going to play a major role in the 
establishment of their state.  An examination of the Palestinian economy, 
GDP, foreign aide and income distribution is mandatory for determining 
the possible success of an independent Palestinian state. 
 
Demographics 
 According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the 2008 
data shows the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza was 
3,825,512.116 The estimated population of the West Bank is 2.4 million; 
1.2 million males and 1.2 million females. While the estimated 
population of Gaza Strip totaled 1.5 million; 755 thousand males and 
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732 thousand females. 117 Data revealed that the Palestinian Territory 
has a young population; the percentage of individuals aged (0-14) 
constitutes 41.9% of the total population in mid 2009, of which 40.0% 
reside in the West Bank and 44.9% in Gaza Strip. The elderly population 
aged (65 years and over) constitute 3.0% of the total population, 3.4% in 
the West Bank and 2.5% in Gaza Strip.118  The disparity between the 
young and old could play a crucial role in the establishment of a 
Palestinian state.  The older generations of Palestinians have failed to 
create a Palestinian state.  Their methods and actions were ineffective.  If 
the younger generations of Palestinians can learn from those mistakes 
and embrace a new strategy in state building, they have more 
opportunity to create a successful independent state.  For an 
independent state to become a reality, the younger generations of 
Palestinians are going to have to focus on literacy and their educations.  
The illiteracy rate among individuals aged 15 years or over in the 
Palestinian Territory was 5.9% in 2008.  The illiteracy gap is significantly 
noticed among males and females, at 2.9% and 9.1% respectively.  The 
results showed differences in the illiteracy rate between the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, 6.1% and 5.6% respectively, while the illiteracy rate 
among males in West Bank is higher than in Gaza Strip (2.9% and 2.7% 
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respectively), while it is lower among females 15 years and over in Gaza 
Strip than in the West Bank (8.6% and 9.4% respectively).119 Education 
statistics show that the percentage of individuals (15 years and over) who 
have completed university education (Bachelor and above) was 8.8%.  
While the percentage of individuals who did not complete any stage of 
education, reached 12.5%. These results showed that there were 
differences between males and females in educational attainment, where 
the percentage of males who have completed university education 
(Bachelor and above) was 9.9% compared to 7.6% for females. As for 
those who did not complete any stage of education, the percentage 
among males was 9.4% compared to 15.7% for females.120  The 
dedication of time and energy into a strong infrastructure for the 
Palestinians will create a strong educational system that will allow 
Palestinians to receive their education.  The fact that there is no money 
available for or spent on Palestinian schools, explains the current 
educational statistics.  The Palestinians that are educated work outside 
of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.  In fact, most Palestinians who 
work, regardless of education, do not work in the West Bank or Gaza 
they work in Israel.121  The only way to gain employment to support their 
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family is to work in the surrounding towns of Israel.  In regard to 
Palestinian families, the fertility rate has dropped in the last forty years.  
According to UNICEF, in 1970 the fertility rate was 7.9 and when new 
statistics came out in 2007, the fertility rate had dropped to 5.2.122  With 
the establishment of strong education system, Palestinians will be able to 
utilize their education in their own towns and create new businesses that 
will in turn create new jobs.  The overall demographics of the Palestinian 
people prove that they are not a small, irrelevant group of people whose 
interests should be cast aside.  There are millions of Palestinians trying 
to survive and maintain their culture and families and sense of 
statehood. 
 
Economic Indicators 
 Another critical component to the success of an independent 
Palestinian state is the Palestinian economy and its ability to provide for 
an independent state.  The Palestinians have several profitable industries 
that could contribute to the overall economic welfare of their state.  The 
Palestinians profitable industries include; stone, construction material, 
textiles and garments, handicrafts, metal and engineering, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, plastics, tourism and most importantly agriculture.123  
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The agricultural sectors in the Palestinian territories are most known for 
their production of olives and olive oil.  However, the economic sanctions 
that are imposed on the Palestinians by the Israelis prohibit the 
Palestinians from developing their economy to its true potential.  There 
are very strong links between the Israeli and Palestinian agricultural 
markets. Israeli fruit, potato, and onion producers, packers and 
wholesalers have very efficient links to West Bank and Gaza wholesale 
markets. The West Bank and Gaza fruit and vegetable distribution is 
primarily through lower cost farmers’ markets and through local 
retailers. The West Bank and Gaza supply the Israeli market with crops 
such as tomatoes, cucumbers, zucchini, eggplant, green peppers and 
guavas. Some high value added products such as strawberries and 
flowers are also supplied to the Israeli market for re-export.124 The 
Palestinians overall income received in 2008 was US$1.6 billion.  There 
was a decline in the value of GDP for the rest of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip during the third quarter of 2008 by 0.6% compared with the second 
quarter of the same year.  Also the fourth quarter of 2008 attend to a 
decrease by 3.0% compared with the third quarter of the same year, 
while it rose from the corresponding quarter of 2007 by 2.3% at constant 
prices. The estimates indicate that the activities of agriculture and 
fisheries, transport and storage and communications, construction 
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activity, mining and quarrying, have seen a decline in the short-term 
economic indicators available during 2008 by 15.7%, 4.1%, 19.0%, 9.7% 
respectively, compared with 2007.125 Palestinians do have the resources, 
labor force and knowledge to sustain a supportive economic system for 
an independent state.  However, Israeli interference and economic 
sanctions are going to have to be eliminated for the Palestinians to be 
successful.  Palestinian income distribution is another economic 
indicator of that was measured in 2006.  The consequences of price rises 
in global markets were keenly felt in the life of the refugees, with an 
individual income of not more that $2 a day.  The year 2006 saw 35% of 
students from the refugee camps leave their university studies.  The 
dropout rate for elementary-school students had also increased, which 
had led to new social problems such as child labor, theft, road accidents, 
and vandalism, as well as to new occupations, including the collection of 
scrap metal.126  The lack of income distribution and earning potential 
among Palestinians forces them to rely on international foreign aid.   
The Palestinian refugees grabbed the attention of the international 
community after the first Intifada.  With the recognition of the 
Palestinian hardships, other states have provided monetary aid to the 
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Palestinian community in hopes of preparing them for an independent 
state.  On December 17, 2007, eighty-seven countries and international 
organizations met in Paris and pledged to provide $7.4 billion over three 
years to the Palestinian Authority (PA), an amount far in excess of any 
previous level of U.S. or European aid to the Palestinians. The conference 
participants justified the aid as a means of providing "immediate support 
to the entire Palestinian population," and as a reward intended to 
strengthen those Palestinians who favor peaceful coexistence with 
Israel.127 The Paris conference aid package continues fifteen years of 
international funding that has established the Palestinians as one of the 
world's leading per capita recipients of foreign support. Figures 
published by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development for 2005 show that Palestinians received $304 per person 
in foreign aid, second only to the war-torn Republic of Congo among 
entities with populations larger than one million.128 The EU was the 
biggest aid donor to the Palestinian government until the Hamas 
militants came to power in March 2006. Since then, the EU has 
redirected its aid, worth 700m euros (US $943m) in 2006, through a 
special mechanism to help the neediest people while bypassing the 
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government to avoid contact with Hamas.129 In fiscal year 2005, the 
Bush Administration and Congress significantly increased U.S. economic 
aid to the Palestinians through supplemental appropriations and by 
reprogramming economic aid that had been appropriated in previous 
years.  President Bush also used his authority to provide $50 million in 
direct assistance to the Palestinian Authority, marking only the fourth 
time a U.S. president has used a congressionally authorized waiver to 
channel aid away from US AID programs and directly to the PA.130 Since 
the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993, the U.S. government has 
committed more than $1.8 billion in economic assistance to the 
Palestinians.  Approximately 80% of U.S. funding for the Palestinians has 
been channeled through USAID contractors and 20% through private 
voluntary organizations (PVOs).  According to annual foreign operations 
legislation, congressionally approved funds for the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip cannot be used for the Palestinian Authority, unless the President 
submits a waiver to Congress citing that doing so is in the interest of 
national security.131 In 2006, Palestinians held a democratic election for 
seats in the Palestinian Authority.  Hamas won the Gaza Strip and won 
several seats from the opposing party, Fatah.  Due to the split in the PA 
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by political groups Fatah and Hamas, international aid was dramatically 
reduced to the Palestinians.  When Hamas took power the Bush 
Administration, along with its Quartet partners and Israel, responded by 
cutting off contact with and halting assistance to the PA.  The 
Administration sought to isolate and remove Hamas while supporting 
moderates in Fatah, led by President Mahmud Abbas. The international 
sanctions have not driven Hamas from power, and instead, some assert 
they may have provided an opening for Iran to increase its influence 
among Palestinians by filling the void.132 Beginning in the early 1990s, 
Iran has supplied cash, arms, and training to Hamas, but most 
observers say the relationship has been an uneasy one.133 Since the aid 
boycott was enacted by the United States and other states, Iran has 
increased its assistance to Hamas.134 The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) estimates that in 2006 some $70 million in cash was carried into 
the territories, most of it thought to be from Iran.  After a visit to Iran in 
December 2006, Prime Minister Haniyeh said Iran had agreed to provide 
$120 million in assistance in 2007 and up to $250 million in total.135 The 
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funds were earmarked to pay the wages of civil servants, bankroll Hamas 
security forces, and compensate Palestinian families that lost their 
homes during Israeli military operations.136 Iran is a major supporter of 
Hamas because they have very similar views about Western influence 
and the corruption it can create for Arab states.  Iran would like to see 
an independent Palestine, even if it there are self-interested reasons 
behind it.   
 
Current Economic Impacts of the Israeli Policies 
  Israel’s control and interference with the Palestinian economy has 
created major difficulties for their overall economic performance.  Ten 
percent of the Palestinian GDP is ordered to the Israeli treasury each 
year.137  After the 1993 declaration of peace the Israeli and Palestinian 
economies became interconnected.  While Israel benefited from the peace 
agreement, the Palestinian economy collapsed.  The reality of the 
Palestinian refugee situation is that Palestinians are forced to find work 
in Israel.  This is a mutually beneficial situation when the economy is 
flourishing and the Palestinians and Israelis are getting along.  If either 
of those circumstances change, which they have, the Palestinians are the 
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ones who are negatively affected.  For example, after the first Intifada, 
Israel dramatically reduced the number of work permits that were issued 
and they became more hard lined in their work permit policies.138  In 
addition, the working environments for Palestinians within Israel were 
not safe.  Israel’s control of the borders is also problematic at times.  
Israel has closed the borders, for days at a time, to prevent the 
Palestinian work force from their jobs.139  When Israeli migration began 
to increase and there was a decline in the Israeli economy, Israel denied 
jobs to Palestinians to create more jobs for the new Jewish settlers.  
Israel restricts Palestinian manufacturing and agriculture and places 
additional restrictions on Palestinian exports to other countries.  Israel 
bases its economic policy on their political concerns with the 
Palestinians.140  This is a typical practice within most states.  However, 
because the political situation with the Palestinians has been so volatile 
over the years, the Israeli economic policies have mirrored that volatility.  
Israeli economic policies are not at all beneficial for the Palestinians and 
their economic development.  The economic integration of the two 
economies together was imposed by Israel to serve their better interests.  
Under this new system, the Israelis were able to control the welfare of the 
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Palestinian people.141 The increased dependency of the Palestinians on 
the Israelis led to lower exports and higher imports.  It eliminated any 
competition between producers.  Palestinian entrepreneurs had to apply 
for licenses from the Israeli authorities for many of the economic 
activities they sought to initiate.  Israel’s policy, at least since the 1990’s, 
has been to slow down local economic development.  This policy, and the 
measures taken to implement it, also contributed to transforming 
important parts of the Palestinian economy into a captive market for 
Israeli producers.142 Israel has done nothing to promote the local 
Palestinian economy; it has been discouraged to protect the Israeli 
markets.  When Palestinians wanted to implement their own trade policy, 
Israel insisted on a more protectionist policy.143 Palestinians have 
pushed for a free trade agreement which would necessitate the 
demarcation of borders between their economy and Israel’s.  The Israelis 
rejected the notion of any borders being drawn that would separate the 
two economies.  The reasons for both of their positions were both 
economic and political.  Palestinians were trying to establish as many 
sovereign qualities as they could and Israelis wanted to defer as many 
decisions as possible over the possibility of independent Palestinian 
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state.144 It was agreed on by both sides to create a Palestinian Monetary 
Authority to help solve the problems of financial intermediation.  The 
PMA was to have all the powers vested in a central bank through a 
banking system, but not the power to issue an independent Palestinian 
currency due to its symbolic expression of independence.145 Israeli trade 
regulation, labor flow control and the lack of a Palestinian currency all 
have been put in place to limit Palestinian sovereignty.  The economic 
interdependence of the Palestinian and Israeli economies should be 
mutually beneficial and that it clearly not the case.  Political stability 
plays a major role in economic development and it is necessary for 
economic growth and economic stability.146  It encourages outside 
investment.  In fact, it could be the political and economic instability and 
lack of Palestinian sovereignty that is contributing to the violence 
between the Israelis and Palestinians. 
 
Physical Infrastructure 
 The reality of a strong, effective Palestinian infrastructure is 
necessary for the legitimate development of a viable, independent 
Palestinian state.  The components of a strong infrastructure are; roads, 
schools, sewage systems, communication systems, territorial integrity 
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and natural resources.  The Palestinians will need to be able to establish 
and maintain these necessities if they hope to be able to provide for and 
support their people.  For an independent state of Palestine to be viable, 
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are going to need to be joined to 
provide the state with the territorial integrity that they deserve.  
Palestinians have lost their land and jeopardized their geographical 
integrity as a result of the expansion of Jewish settlements by the Zionist 
agenda of the Israeli government.  The establishment of these 
settlements has limited the Palestinians ability to create their own state.  
The West Bank barrier wall that has been constructed by the Israeli 
government is another way in which the geographic identity of the 
Palestinians is being violated.  Although the Israeli government claims 
the wall is necessary to protect Israeli citizens from Palestinian violence, 
some feel it is an illegal attempt by the Israelis to annex land from the 
Palestinians.  The wall violates international law and yet it still remains.  
Palestinians need to be given the right to unite their territories.  If Israel 
returns to the 1967 borders, the two territories will unite.  If the 
Palestinian land remains divided, the people will become more divided 
than they already are.  Palestinians need to be allowed to create their 
infrastructure in peace, without the outside threat of the Israelis.   
The problem with the Palestinian infrastructure, at this time, is 
that there is no Palestinian infrastructure.  Any roads that run 
throughout the West Bank or Gaza are developed and maintained by 
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Israel.  The WBGS road network is just over 2,000 km in length, with 
750 km of main roads, 550 km of regional roads, and 850 km of local 
roads.  Virtually all the major roads were constructed before 1967 and 
have received minimal or no maintenance.  International transportation 
(ports and airports) are almost entirely under Israeli control.  The 
exceptions are the bridges to Jordan and the Rafah crossing to Egypt.147  
 The same applies to the electricity utilized by the Palestinians.  It 
is owned and operated by the Israelis.  Over 95 percent of households 
have electricity connections.  Those not connected tend to be located in 
remote communities.  However, connection does not necessarily imply an 
adequate or steady supply of electricity.  Presently, the WBGS has access 
to about 300 Mw of power, almost entirely supplied by the Israel Electric 
Company (IEC).  Certain village communities not connected to the grid 
use local generators.148   
The lack of natural resources, or the Palestinians lack of access to 
the natural resources in their territory, is another important element of 
their infrastructure that needs to be retrieved from the Israelis.  Water 
quality has been steadily deteriorating.  With depleting aquifers, seawater 
seepage in the Gaza Strip has rendered the water brackish.  The entry of 
sewage, fertilizers, and other chemicals into the water system continually 
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damages the water quality.  Water supply is substantially, and 
increasingly, dependent upon the Israeli company, Mekoroth, though not 
quite to the same extent as electricity.  Israel restricts the digging of new 
wells by Palestinians.  New sources within the WBGS can be tapped by 
Mekoroth, which then supplies distributors in the Palestinian areas.149    
Amnesty International has done a recent investigation into the 
Palestinian water supply and has found Israeli water restrictions 
discriminate against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank.  It says 
that in Gaza, Israel's blockade has pushed the already ailing water and 
sewage system to "crisis point". Amnesty says that on average Palestinian 
daily water consumption reaches 70 liters a day, compared with 300 
liters for the Israelis.  It says that some Palestinians barely get 20 liters a 
day, the minimum recommended even in humanitarian emergencies.150   
Water is the most important natural resource, not only for personal 
survival, but to maintain the Palestinians major economic market; their 
agriculture market.  For the Palestinian agriculture market to succeed, 
Palestinians need to have access to as many natural resources as 
possible.   
The Palestinian communication systems will also need to be 
assessed and developed.  Restricted access to telecommunications 
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presents a major limitation for growth.  With 78,000 phones, there are 
just over three phones for every 100 persons.  Due to the extreme 
shortage of conventional phones, 25,000 mobile phones are in use (about 
one mobile phone for 100 persons).  Prior to the peace process, 
telecommunication services were supplied by the Israeli company, Bezeq, 
and the ICA controlled the local access to service.  Since 1993, the local 
loop is controlled by the PA's Ministry of Communications.  However, 
most long-distance services, even within the Palestinian areas, and all 
international services, continue to be provided by Bezeq.  The lack of 
phones is already proving a constraint to investment.  In Ramallah, 
obtaining a phone connection is a major undertaking and has deterred 
investors.  If the vision of an information society is to be seriously 
pursued, and if trade in services is to take off, basic phone service needs 
a major boost.151 
The sewage and sanitation systems are also in serious need of a 
complete overhaul.  The most serious immediate problem is the state of 
sanitation services.  The share of households connected to sewage 
networks is small by any standard, at 25 percent.  Collection, treatment, 
and disposal of sewage are growing problems.  The networks, where they 
exist, are under great strain and are liable to burst frequently, risking 
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people's health and causing severe disruption to the movement of goods 
and people as roads are flooded.152  
 
Political Institutions 
The Palestinian political infrastructure needs to be modified and 
reorganized.  The corruption that has been so prevalent within Fatah and 
the PA needs to be addressed and eliminated.  The Palestinians have the 
ability and education to create and sustain a strong infrastructure that 
can contribute to the success of an independent Palestinian state.  The 
best situation for the state may be a regular flow of elite university 
graduates, including many with sophisticated technical training, into 
official careers that are of such high status as to keep the most 
ambitious and successful from moving on to non-state positions.153   A 
unified, legitimized Palestinian political system is possible if the political 
parties are willing to make compromises for the establishment of a 
Palestinian state.  The political system needs to represent all of the 
Palestinians because Palestinians can no longer allow themselves to be 
segregated into Gaza and West Bank Palestinians.  The Palestinian 
Authority needs to be held accountable for their actions.  The PA was 
created to be the foundation of a Palestinian political system that the 
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world wanted to deal with.  It is time the Palestinians took ownership of 
their role in the establishment of their state and work towards creating a 
political system that can actually govern the Palestinians as a state.  
Obviously, sheer sovereign integrity and the stable administrative-
military control of a given territory are preconditions for any state’s 
ability to implement policies.  Beyond this, loyal and skilled officials and 
plentiful financial resources are basic to state effectiveness in attaining 
all sorts of goals.154  For the Palestinians to create a new, uncorrupt 
Palestinian Authority the issue of the number of people who are actually 
educated and qualified to fill those types of positions must be addressed.  
The number of Palestinians that are qualified for bureaucratic positions 
and the responsibility associated with it is extremely limited.  The 
Palestinians that are educated and prepared for those positions are 
already in those positions, thus further exacerbating the situation.  The 
meritocracy within the political positions creates a detrimental cycle for 
the future of Palestinian institutions.  With the creation of a solid 
infrastructure and the development and progress of Palestinian 
education, the Palestinians will be able to fill and supplement 
bureaucratic positions and avoid an extended tradition of corruption.  
When a Palestinian institution is established that is accepted by the 
majority, Palestinians that have found work elsewhere will have a reason 
                                                           
154 Skocpol, 16 
 101 
to return and invest in their state.  Qualified, educated Palestinians will 
not have to look outside for careers and Arab migration will have the 
opportunity to increase. 
Palestinians need a political system that can handle and account 
for the millions of dollars they receive in foreign aid every year.  The PA 
needs to be controlled by political leaders that are going to utilize and 
invest the money into a solid infrastructure for the Palestinians to build 
off of.  The appearance of corruption and self interest must be avoided.  
Strategies in institution building suggest a successful framework that 
can include the introduction of elements of accountability into 
organizations, the de-layering or simplification of operations to reduce 
errors and opportunities to conceal corruption, as well as more 
fundamental reforms seeking to change the attitudes and beliefs of those 
who work in an institution.  In some cases, institutions may be 
completely eliminated or restructured for a fresh start, or completely new 
institutions may be created.155    The establishment of a new, unified PA 
will provide the foundation for a solid infrastructure to support a new 
Palestinian state.  The PA will be able to organize and establish all the 
other components of a successful infrastructure, leading to the healthy 
development of a strong Palestinian state.  As an institution, the PA has 
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the potential to be rebuilt and reorganized.  The Palestinians do not have 
to create a brand new institution, they need to remake the PA into the 
institution it was meant to be, free of corruption. The target group at 
which institution-building reforms are directed must also be widened to 
include all parts of society interested in creating and maintaining 
national integrity.156  To create an independent state of Palestine from 
the inside out, the Palestinians will need to evaluate and adjust all of the 
political institutions and their role within the political infrastructure. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Looking forward, what are the possible conflict resolutions, 
currently being discussed, that can bring an end to the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict?  A popular opinion is a two state solution which would 
re-establish the 1967 borders and give the Palestinians complete, 
autonomous control of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem.  Some unrealistic, alternate solutions that have been 
suggested are to create single states, one entirely Israeli, the other 
entirely Palestinian.  The solution of a single Israeli state is proposed and 
supported by the Zionist movement.  The single state solutions have no 
chance of being followed through to fruition.  The most beneficial, all-
encompassing solution would be the suggested two-state solution where 
the independent states of Israel and Palestine co-exist next to one 
another.  However, for the two state solution to be successful, several 
things would need to transpire.  One would be that the state of Palestine 
would need to be granted the territory of the 1967 borders, which will 
unite the Gaza Strip and West Bank to allow for territorial integrity.  A 
unified territory is necessary in the establishment of a sovereign state.  
Another situation that needs to be addressed is the continuous 
development and expansion of Jewish settlements in Palestinian areas.  
Israel will have to grant the Palestinians an autonomous state which will 
eliminate the Zionist agenda of expanding Jewish settlements into 
Palestinian areas.  Another suggested solution is that of Restoration.  
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This would mean that Israel would be required to allow Arabs to return 
to their original areas and homes and not only the refugees, but the 
Arabs that fled Palestine in 1948.  Palestinians need to be granted the 
security to build a solid foundation for a new state. 
 Whether one of the above mentioned solutions or a new solution is 
suggested, it is time to put an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  The 
Western attitude that all Arabs and Middle Easterners have been fighting 
since the beginning of time and will always continue to fight is a 
perspective the world can no longer accept.  It is time to re-evaluate and 
challenge the entire situation and begin holding Israel responsible for 
their actions.  If that also includes holding the United States responsible, 
then that time has come.  Over the years both sides have created their 
own interpretations of the events that have made up this conflict during 
the course of the twentieth century.  Each has sought to convince the 
rest of the world that its version is the correct one.  Israel has enjoyed 
greater success in this effort for a variety of reasons.  History is written 
by the victors.  In this case the victors, largely of European descent, have 
the skills, contacts, and receptive audiences in the West that ensured the 
predominance of their arguments.157  By removing the United States, as 
a major player, from the equation perhaps surrounding Arab states could 
make a united stand to protect the Palestinian interest.  Their united 
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front could benefit the current regimes in power by legitimizing their 
position and demonstrating a level of power.  Muslims all over the world 
are understandably exacerbated with their leaders for having failed to 
defeat the Israelis, either militarily or diplomatically, in over five 
decades.158  Concurrently, if Hamas were legitimized by their 
surrounding region as the elected representatives of the Palestinian 
people, that in turn could lead to their legitimacy in the international 
community which could influence support for the viability of an 
established Palestinian state.  Hamas has made several attempts to 
propel themselves forward ideologically.  There has been an evolution in 
the attitude of Hamas with regard to participation in the political 
process.  They moved from an extremist position rejecting participation 
in any political process, like elections, under the occupation to a much 
cleverer one-as it proves now in light of the success they are achieving-of 
getting involved in the political process.159  Just because Hamas is not 
embraced by the United States simply because they are a threat to the 
Israeli agenda, does not mean that the rest of the world needs to adopt 
the same attitude.  In fact, if the U.S. were to create a more even-handed 
policy in regards to the West Bank and Gaza, it could actually contribute 
to the establishment of a Palestinian state.   
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 The Palestinians are ready for their own independent, sovereign 
state.  The principle of respect for the sovereignty of nations is and must 
remain the cornerstone of international law.160  Palestinians have the 
potential to be very successful with an autonomous state.  For example, 
the Palestinian people are well educated and value higher education.  
They have both financial and social capital.  Their social capital includes 
a well organized civil society, NGOs, Universities and hospitals that 
provide public services.  Palestinians have a rich culture and before the 
1967 War, Palestinians made a lot of their overall profits from tourism.  
Once the Arab-Israeli conflict comes to an end, people will feel more 
confident to travel back into Palestinian areas and revive their culture 
and traditions.  Palestinians are debt free because they have a good tax 
system and they receive a lot of international aid.  Combine with the 
financial aid they also have a lot of international sympathy and support.  
This support can lead to direct foreign investment which will help boost 
the Palestinian economy. 
 A solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the establishment of an 
independent Palestinian state does not mean that there will never be 
another conflict between the two groups again.  The rest of the world can 
only hope that non-violent agreements can be suggested and 
                                                           
160 Amin, Samir. “Globalism or Apartheid on a Global Scale?” The Modern World-System 
in the Longue Duree. Ed. Immanuel Wallerstine. Colorado: Paradigm Publishers, 2004. 
Page 21. 
 107 
accomplished.  The struggle for peace is certainly not a struggle 'to 
abolish power' just as little as it is an attempt 'to get rid of conflicts'. It is 
an effort to steer the exercise of power in non-violent directions and to 
steer conflicts towards non-violent and creative forms of conflict 
resolution.161  A mutual respect for sovereign states is necessary for the 
Palestinians and Israelis to coexist in an ancient territory.  Their further 
development within a peaceful conflict resolution will ensure the survival 
of that respect.  
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